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I. INTRODUCTION
Initiative 300,1 also known as "The Family Farm Amendment,"2
was approved as an amendment to the Constitution of the State of
Nebraska by a majority of the state's voters on November 2, 1982.3
Initiative 300, evidently4 an agglomeration of so called "family farm
acts" found in the laws of eight of Nebraska's neighboring states,
in varying degrees restricts corporations and limited partnerships
from owning farmland or engaging in farming operations.5 Ne-
braska is the only state to have grafted such restrictions upon its
state constitution.6
1. The full text of Initiative 300, NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8, cl. 1, is printed in Ap-
pendix 1, infra. The amendment continues to be popularly referred to as "In-
itiative 300," and for purposes of clarity and brevity will be so referred to in
this Note.
2. The proponents of Initiative 300 appealed to the emotions of the voters by
promoting the idea that the Initiative, if passed, would "Save the Family
Farm." That slogan evokes strong images and reactions, especially in the
midst of the agricultural midwest. However, as this Note later discusses, the
purposes for rising up in arms were not established and the Initiative is not
properly drawn to effectuate any perceivable purpose. See infra text accom-
panying notes 153-78, 194-270.
3. The final vote was close, with 290,377 votes in favor of Initiative 300 and 224,555
votes against. NEB. SEC'Y OF STATE, Abstract of Votes, Gen. Election, Initia-
tive 300, at 45 (November 2, 1982).
4. The birth of Initiative 300 itself was relatively quiet. The major proponents of
the Initiative have not acknowledged a specific author or authors of the legis-
lation but hint that the Farmer's Union of Nebraska played a major role in
drafting Initiative 300. See Transcript of the Public Hearing on Initiative 300
Before the Committee on Banking, Commerce, and Insurance, 88th Leg., 2d
Sess. (Neb. Leg. 1982) (Comments of Senator Burrows) [hereinafter cited as
Initiative 300 Hearing ]. The opponents have pointed to this lack of specific-
ity as evidence that it was drafted by novices with no legal training, which
thereby accounts for the Initiative's inherent ambiguities.
5. See Senator Burrows comments regarding the origin of Initiative 300's statu-
tory provisions, INrrIATrvE 300 HEARING, supra note 4, at 3. The eight other
states which have adopted laws statutorily restricting the corporate owner-
ship of farmland and their corresponding statutes are: IowA CODE ANN.
§§ 172C.1-.15 (West Supp. 1981-1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-5901 to -5902
(1974); MIN. STAT. ANN. § 500.24 (West Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 350.010
to .030 (Vernon Supp. 1982); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-06-01 to -15 (Supp. 1981);
OKiA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 951-956 (West Supp. 1981-1982); S.D. CODIFIED
LAws ANN. §§ 47-9A-1 to -23 (Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 182.001 (West
Supp. 1981-1982).
6. Although Oklahoma still has a constitutional amendment strictly prohibiting
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The description of Initiative 300, which was placed on the bal-
lot 7 for voter information, summarized the object8 of the prospec-
tive amendment as follows:
INITIATIVE ORDERED BY PETITION OF THE
PEOPLE
#300
A vote "FOR" will create a constitutional prohibition against further
purchase of Nebraska farm and ranch lands by any corporation or syndi-
cate other than a Nebraska family farm corporation.
A vote "AGAINST" will reject such a constitutional restriction on own-
ership of Nebraska farm and ranch land.
corporate ownership of farmland outside the city limits, the Oklahoma State
Supreme Court interpreted the amendment in 1969 to allow corporate owner-
ship of farmland. LeForce v. Bullard, 454 P.2d 297 (Okla. 1969). Shortly after
the LeForce decision, the Oklahoma Legislature passed a law to limit the
scope of that decision and to restrict corporate ownership of farmland. OKuA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 951-956 (West Supp. 1981-1982). See Commentary, 28
TULSA L.J. 151 (1972) for a short explanation of the supreme court's ruling in
LeForce.
7. To submit the proposed amendment to the ballot for voter decision, the peti-
tion had to meet the following requirements of article III, section II of the
Nebraska State Constitution:
[I]f the petition be for the amendment of the Constitution, the peti-
tion therefore shall be signed by ten per cent of such electors. In all
cases the electors signing such petition shall be so distributed as to
include five per cent of the electors of each of two-fifths of the coun-
ties of the state and when thus signed the petition shall be filed with
the Secretary of State, who shall submit the measure thus proposed
to the electors of the state at the first general election held not less
than four months after such petition shall have been filed.
NEB. CONsT. art. Mll, § 2 (excerpt). Additionally, section IV of article III of the
Nebraska Constitution requires:
The whole number of votes cast for Governor at the general election
next preceding the filing of an initiative or referendum petition shall
be the basis on which the number of signatures to such petition shall
be computed. The veto power of the Governor shall not extend to
measures initiated by or referred to the people. A measure initiated
shall become a law or part of the Constitution, as the case may be,
when a majority of the votes cast thereon, and not less than thirty-
five percent of the total vote cast at the election at which the same
was submitted, are cast in favor thereof, and shall take effect upon
proclamation by the Governor which shall be made within ten days
after the official canvass of such votes.
NEB. CONST. art. III, § 4 (excerpt).
The last day to file the Initiative was July 2, 1982. The total number of
votes for Governor in November, 1978, was 492,423, so the total number of sig-
natures required to put Initiative 300 on the ballot was 49,242, which had to be
divided among 38 counties (two-fifths of the ninety-three counties in Ne-
braska). The petitioners submitted 56,636 valid signatures, which constituted
representation from each of the ninety-three counties in Nebraska, on March
2, 1982. NEB. SEC'Y OF STATE, Initiative 300 Petition, Public Record, certified
March 2, 1982.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 157-63, for import of the word "object."
INITIATIVE 300
Shall a constitutional prohibition be created prohibiting ownership of
Nebraska farm or ranch land by any corporation, domestic or foreign,
which is not a Nebraska family farm corporation, or by any syndicate as
defined, with certain exceptions? A family corporation would be defined
in part as a corporation in which the majority of the voting stock is held by
members of a family related to one another within the fourth degree of
kindred or their spouses and where at least one member of the family re-
sides on the land and where none of the family members are nonresident
aliens. 9
This seemingly simple and straightforward ballot summary dis-
guises what is in fact the longest and perhaps most complicated
amendment ever to be added to the Nebraska Constitution.10 Initi-
ative 300 is a maze of undefined terms, ambiguous phraseology,
and special exceptions, which collectively defy precise legal inter-
pretation, and frustrate uniform application.
At a minimum, Initiative 300 radically alters traditional rights of
land alienation in Nebraska enjoyed by individuals," which rights
have been extended by statute to corporations and partnerships.12
9. NEB. SEc'Y OF STATE, Ballot Sample, General Election (November 2, 1982). It
is the contention of many of the opponents of Initiative 300 that many of the
voters had not read the proposed amendment in its entirety prior to casting
their votes and, therefore, that the voters were not sufficiently informed of
the enormous social, economic, and legal ramifications created by the propo-
sal to enable them to make a valid judgment. These contentions were made
at a debate in the seminar. 'Taxes and Initiative 300," Nebraska Continuing
Legal Education (January 21, 1983), as well as by voters after the adoption of
the amendment. See NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8, cl. 1; see also infra Appendix 1,
to compare the complexity of the amendment with the ballot summary.
10. Even the most adamant proponent of the amendment will generally admit its
complexities. Initiative 300 has added over 1,100 words to the Nebraska Con-
stitution, and on November 2, 1982 it became the largest section amended to
that constitution. See NEB. CONsT. art. XII, § 8, cl. 1; see also infra Appendix
1.
11. See Lincoln Dairy Co. v. Finigan, 170 Neb. 777, 104 N.W.2d 227 (1960), where
the Nebraska Supreme Court stated:
A citizen clearly has the right to engage in any occupation not det-
rimental to the public health, safety, and welfare. Measures adopted
by the Legislature to protect the public health and secure the public
safety and welfare must have some reasonable relation to those pro-
posed ends. A citizen has a constitutional right to own, acquire, and
sell property, and if it becomes apparent that the statute, under the
guise of a police regulation, does not tend to preserve the public
health, safety, or welfare, but tends more to stifle legitimate business
by creating a monopoly or trade barrier, it is unconstitutional as an
invasion of the property rights of the individual ....
Id. at 785, 104 N.W.2d at 233.
12. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2004 (Cum. Supp. 1982) states in part:
Each corporation shall have power.
(4) To purchase, take, receive, lease, or otherwise acquire, own,
hold, improve, use, and otherwise deal in and with, real or per-
sonal property, or any interest therein, whenever situated;
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Intiative 300's restrictions also establish new distinctions as to who
will or will not be allowed to actually engage in the businesses of
farming and ranching.13 Laws which alter and restrict such basic
and fundamental interests as the right to own and sell property
and the right to pursue a gainful living or employment inherently
raise serious questions of federal constitutional dimension. Initia-
tive 300's objectives are effected in large part through the creation
of an array of specific classifications,14 including: related versus
unrelated individuals;'5 first cousins versus second cousins;1 6 pro-
ducers of horticultural products' 7 versus producers of nursery
plants and sod;18 corn producers19 versus alfalfa producers;20 and
pork breeders 21 versus poultry breeders, 22 all of which became col-
lectively referred to as the "Battle of the Corporate Pig Versus the
Corporate Chicken."23
The most significant of these classifications, which is also the
most legally questionable, is the distinction between the nature of
activities which may be engaged in by related persons and the ac-
(5) To sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, transfer, and
otherwise dispose of all or any part of its property and assets;
NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-306 (1981) states in part:
(1) A partnership is an association of persons organized as a sepa-
rate entity to carry on a business for profit.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-308 (1981) states in part:
(3) Any estate in real property may be acquired in the partnership
name. Title so acquired can be conveyed only in the partner-
ship name.
13. See NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8, cl. 1; see infra Appendix 1.
14. Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 194-270, for discussion of those
classifications.
15. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8, cl. 1(A); see infra Appendix 1.
16. Id.
17. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8, cl. 1; see infra Appendix 1.
18. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8, cl. 1(H); see infra Appendix 1.
19. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8; see infra Appendix 1.
20. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8, cl. 1(G); see infra Appendix 1.
21. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8; see infra Appendix 1.
22. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8, cl. I(F); see infra Appendix 1.
23. This phrase was used primarily by opponents of Initiative 300 to indicate
their opinions as to the inadequacy of the various classifications within Initia-
tive 300. The hog industry is now subject to ownership restrictions as it is not
included within the exceptions in Initiative 300, while the poultry industry
may continue to incorporate without such restrictions. NEB. CONST. art. XII,
§ 8, cl. 1 (F); see infra Appendix 1. Presumably, because such a large majority
of the poultry industry is already in corporate form, there is no hope of or
desire to "save" that industry for family farmers. See also Transcript, Panel
Discussion, University of Nebraska, Lincoln (Nov. 1982). Moderator- Dr. Ray
Arnold, Panelists: Dr. Lloyd Fisher, Professor of Agricultural Economics,
University of Nebraska; Neil Oxton, President of the Nebraska Farmers
Union, Proponent of Initiative 300; Glen LeDioyt, President of LeDioyt Land
Company, Opponent of Initiative 300; Dr. Nelson Otto, President of Anticipa-
tory Sciences, Inc., Minneapolis, Minnesota at 4.
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tivities which may be engaged in by unrelated persons.24 The Initi-
ative's corporate ownership requirements demand at least a
majority control of the voting stock by family members.25 Simi-
larly, all partners in a limited partnership must be members of a
farnily.26 Groups of unrelated persons are thereby prohibited from
participating in limited partnership ventures and are relegated to a
minority interest in any corporate venture. These rules would pre-
vent two unrelated neighboring farmers from jointly and equally
acquiring or operating additional farmland in a corporate organiza-
tion while permitting two related farmers, wherever they may live,
to utilize a corporate organization to acquire the same land.27 Initi-
ative 300 does not contain a special exception allowing comparable
corporations for unrelated persons. 28 Thus, Initiative 300 severely
impairs the ability of unrelated persons to participate in farming
business ventures, which provide limited liability29 and invest-
ment tax advantages.
Of nearly equal significance is the questionable classification
concerning the limitations on the degree of kindred required to
qualify as a member of a family for purposes of the corporate and
syndicate ownership rules. 30 Initiative 300 requires a majority of
the voting stock of a family corporation and all interests in a lim-
ited partnership to be owned by members of a family related
within the fourth degree of kindred, i.e., that relationship no more
distant than first cousins.3 1
24. NEB. CONST. art. X1i, § 8, cls. 1-1(A); see infra Appendix 1.
25. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 179-88.
26. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8, cl. I(A); see infra Appendix 1.
27. NEB. CONST. art. Xii, § 8, cl. 1; see infra Appendix 1.
28. Id.
29. Corporations and limited partnerships are traditional vehicles to limit the
financial liability of the entity's participants. Stockholders and limited part-
ners, in most cases, are liable for corporate or partnership debts only to the
extent of their investment in the entity. Sole proprietors and general part-
ners, on the other hand, are usually personally liable for the total amount of
the debt incurred by the entity. See generally D. BRODY, THE AMERICAN LE-
GAL SYSTEM: CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES 147-206 (1978); H. LUTZ, C. HEWETT, J.
DONNELLE, & A. BARNES, BusINEss LAW: PRINCIPLES AND CASES 385-744 (4th
ed. 1978).
30. NEB. CONST. art. X1I, § 8, cl. 1(A); see infra Appendix 1; see also Consanguin-
ity Chart, infra Appendix 2; infra text accompanying notes 189-90.
31. NEB. CONsT. art. Xfl, § 8, cl. I(A); see infra Appendix 1; see also Consanguin-
ity Chart, infra Appendix 2. The states with corporate farming statutes have
varying requirements which must be met to be able to conform to the defini-
tion of "family," thereby qualifying as a family farm corporation. Iowa basi-
cally requires that a majority of stockholders of the family farm corporation
be "lineal descendents of grandparents or their spouses." IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 172C.1 (8) (a) (West Supp. 1981-82). Kansas does not state a requirement for
family farm corporations. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-5901 to 17-5902 (1974). Min-
nesota requires a family farm relationship "within the third degree of kin-
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Whether such classifications improperly abridge important ex-
isting rights is best determined in conjunction with an analysis
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
While discussion focusing on the due process and commerce
clauses of the fourteenth amendment may also be appropriate,3 2
dred." MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 500.24(2)(c) (West Supp. 1982). Missouri also
limits a family corporation to "within the third degree of consanguinity." Mo.
STAT. ANN. § 350.010(5) (Vernon Supp. 1982). North Dakota describes degrees
of kinship which approximately equal kindred to the fourth degree. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 10-06-07(2) (Supp. 1981). Oklahoma sets forth "lineal descend-
ants" requirements for family farm corporations. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 951(A) (3) (West Supp. 1981-1982). South Dakota restricts family corporate
restrictions "within the third degree of kindred." S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
47-9A-14 (Supp. 1982). Finally, Wisconsin has established a requirement
combining lineal descent with a type of fourth degree requirement. Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 182.001(1)(a) (West Supp. 1981-1982).
32. The commerce clause states that "Congress shall have Power... [t] o regu-
late Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes. . ." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. The due process clause
proclaims "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .. " U.S. CONsT. amend. XlV, § 1. Arguments
of due process are beyond the scope of this Note but not beyond the scope of
arguments for the counsel of a corporation seeking to sell land purchased
after Initiative 300 was adopted. Note that the Initiative has an escheat provi-
sion under which "[t]he court shall order any land held in violation of this
amendment to be divested within two years. If land so ordered by the court
has not been divested within two years, the court shall order the land es-
cheated to the State of Nebraska." NEB. CONsT. art. XII, § 8, cl. 1; see infra
Appendix 1. Therefore, Initiative 300 contains no provision for judicial sale of
land and a reimbursement of proceeds to the corporate landowner. Corpora-
tions are not prohibited from acquiring title to land which they purchased;
"[e Ischeat can apply only to lands to which the corporation has title." Loy v.
Kessler, 39 N.W.2d 260, 272 (N.D. 1979). See discussion of Loy, infra note 79.
However, the United States Supreme Court has held that even foreign corpo-
rations should be "afforded a fair opportunity to realize the value of the land,
and that the sale, when required is to be under conditions reasonably calcu-
lated to realize its value at time of sale." Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 326
U.S. 207, 212-13 (1945); see also infra text accompanying notes 68-76, 184-88, for
further analysis of Asbury and its significance in relation to Initiative 300.
Therefore, the escheat provision in Initiative 300 should either be amended to
allow a "fair opportunity to realize the value [of the land] .... " 326 U.S. at
212-13, or should be repealed as it seems to violate the opinion of the United
States Supreme Court in Asbury.
The due process clause might also be used to scrutinize the categories of
relatives who are permitted to own stock in a "family farm corporation."
Under Initiative 300, a majority of the voting stock of such a corporation must
be owned by family members related to one another within the fourth degree
of kindred, or their spouses. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8, cl. 1; see infra Appendi-
ces 1 and 2. Thus, for example, second cousins would have to be precluded
from stock ownership in a family farm corporation if that corporation were to
qualify under Initiative 300's family farm corporation exemption.
In Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1976), the Supreme Court held
that a city ordinance was invalid, under the due process clause, which limited
[Vol. 62:770
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this Note will confine its scope to whether Initiative 300 contra-
venes the equal protection clause.33 In order to give perspective to
such an analysis, Part I traces the history of attempts to adopt fam-
ily farm legislation in Nebraska and compares the essential ele-
ments of Initiative 300 with family farm legislation in other states.
the occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a single family. Id. at 499.
The ordinance contained a very restrictive definition of "family" and thus es-
tablished certain categories of family members who could live together and
declared that others outside of those categories could not dwell in the same
unit. Id. The city of East Cleveland convicted a grandmother of a violation of
this ordinance for living in a home with two of her grandsons. Justice Powell,
writing for the majority, concluded that:
When a city undertakes such intrusive regulation of the family,...
the usual judicial deference to the family is inappropriate. "This
court has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters
of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion, referred to freedom of personal
choices in matters of family life as "fundamental rights." Id. at 513.
Additionally, the Court developed its rationale concerning "family living
arrangements" from previous cases dealing with other forms of protected
family relationships, such as freedom of choice with respect to childbearing
and the rights of parents to the custody and companionship of their own chil-
dren. After reviewing these cases, Justice Powell determined that: "unless
we close our eyes to the basic reasons why certain rights associated with the
family have been accorded shelter under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause, we cannot avoid applying the force and rationale of these
precedents to the family choice involved in this case." Id. at 501 (emphasis
supplied).
Similarly, it could be argued that the associated right of family members
to join together to engage in the common pursuit of their economic well-be-
ing, such as owning stock in a family corporation, should also receive the pro-
tection of the due process clause. Therefore, the legislative line-drawing in
Initiative 300, which excludes certain categories of related persons from such
ownership, should be held invalid.
Another constitutional argument might be advanced under the interstate
commerce clause of the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8. The Supreme Court has stated:
A court may invalidate legislation enacted under the Commerce
Clause only if it is clear that there is no rational basis for a Congres-
sional finding that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce,
or that there is no reasonable connection between the regulatory
means selected and the asserted ends.
Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1981). In Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.
Ct. 3456 (1982), the Supreme Court ruled that Nebraska is limited by the com-
merce clause in regulation of its water resources. It is possible that a court
might find that Nebraska, via Initiative 300, is limiting otherwise legitimate
entities (nonfamily farm corporations) from engaging in the production of
agricultural products which move in the stream of interstate commerce,
thereby violating the interstate commerce clause.
33. The equal protection clause requires that no state "deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U. S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1. See infra discussion of recent Supreme Court equal protection decisions
in text accompanying notes 89-152.
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Part H discusses the modern test used by the Supreme Court of
the United States to identify improper classifications under the
equal protection clause. Part Ill examines the classifications cre-
ated by Initiative 300 under the lens of the equal protection clause
to determine whether the classifications created under the Initia-
tive further its identifiable purposes. Finally, the Note concludes
that Initiative 300 does not rationally promote its purposes and
therefore should not survive judicial evaluation under the United
States Constitution.34
II. THE HISTORY OF CORPORATE FARMING LEGISLATION
IN NEBRASKA
Throughout history there have been arguments, regulations,
and wars over the ownership and control of agricultural land.35
The Homestead Act of 186236 and the National Reclamation Act of
190237 are just two examples of the numerous attempts in Ameri-
can history to regulate farms by promoting wide distribution of
small farm ownership. 38 Over the last four decades, however, the
American agricultural sector has witnessed a trend towards in-
creasing farm size and decreasing farm numbers. Between 1945
and 1978, the number of farms in Nebraska decreased from nearly
112,000 farms to less than 67,000 farms 39 while the size of the aver-
age farm increased from 427 acres to 702 acres.40 Reasons for these
phenomena are numerous. "Federal programs for research, credit,
price support and production stabilization have tended to favor
large-scale agriculture .... Technological developments, financ-
ing and marketing efficiency, and inflation, especially of land
prices, have combined with government policy to encourage in-
34. It is not within the scope of this Note to address a comprehensive examina-
tion of the meaning of each section of the amendment.
35. For background history of agricultural disputes, see Taylor, Public Policy and
the Shaping of Rural Society, 20 S.D. L. REV. 475 (1975).
36. Ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862) (repealed 1891). The purpose of the Homestead Act
was to favor actual settlement on the land in order to promote stability.
37. Ch. 1093, § 5, 32 Stat. 389 (1902) (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 431 (1976)).
The National Reclamation Act was intended to guard against land
monopolization.
38. See Phelps, Corporate Farming Statutes, 2 WHrrrER L. REV. 441-47 (1980);
Taylor, supra note 35, at 475-87 (1975).
39. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1978 Census ofAgricul-
ture, State Data: Nebraska, Table 1, "Farms Land in Farms and Land Use:
1945 to 1978." See infra text accompanying notes 194-247 for discussion on
trends in farm sizes.
40. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1978 Census ofAgricul-
ture, State Data. Nebraska, Table 1, "Farms Land in Farms and Land Use:
1945 to 1978." See infra text accompanying notes 194-247 for discussion on
trends in farm sizes.
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creased farm size."41 Simultaneously, for a host of legal and
financial reasons, there has been an increasing trend towards cor-
porate involvement in agriculture both from a land ownership and
an operational standpoint.42 The accumulation of these factors has
resulted in an evolution of the basic structure of agricultural soci-
ety in Nebraska, as well as nationally, which has fueled a wide-
spread fear of corporate involvement in agriculture. This fear has
apparently spurred the recent surge of state anti-corporate farm-
ing legislation. Nebraska is but one of nine states which has re-
cently responded to the emotional cry to 'preserve the family
farm." 43
Since 1972, numerous legislative proposals have been submit-
ted to the Nebraska Legislature containing prohibitions against
corporate farming similar to those existing in Initiative 300.44 The
proposed bills were substantially similar to one another, and each
bill failed to receive legislative approval largely because of Ne-
braska Attorney General opinions, which in each case viewed the
proposed legislation as having "suspect constitutional validity"45
41. Phelps, spra note 38, at 445.
42. COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION AND FORESTRY, U.S. SENATE, 97TH CONG.,
IST SESS., STATUS OF THE FAMILY FARM: FARM ORGANIZATION AND PERFORM-
ANCE IN THE 1970's 15 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter cited as STATUS OF THE
FAMILY FARM: 19821.
43. The proponents of Initiative 300 understood the power such emotionally
based language could have on the voters and chose to have even their polit-
ical campaign headed by the "Committee to Preserve the Family Farm," Jann
Douglas, Treasurer, Campaign Literature (Fall, 1982).
44. The bills proposed included:
(1) L.B. 184, 87th Leg., Ist Sess. (Neb. 1981);
(2) L.B. 837, 86th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 1980);
(3) L.B. 190, 85th Leg., ist Sess. (Neb. 1979);
(4) L.B. 721, 84th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 1978);
(5) L.B. 130, 83rd Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 1977);
(6) L.B. 203, 81st Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 1975);
(7) L.B. 214, 81st Leg., Ist Sess. (Neb. 1975); and
(8) L.B. 1137, 78th Leg., Ist Sess. (Neb. 1972).
This list is not exhaustive as the Bill Room of the Nebraska State Legislature
does not maintain copies of bills introduced but not adopted. For further leg-
islative proposals of corporate farming laws, see:
(1) L.B. 713, 88th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 1982);
(2) L.B. 668, 88th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 1982);
(3) L.B. 190, 85th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 1979);
(4) L.B. 751, 84th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 1978);
(5) L.B. 933, 82d Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 1976);
(6) L.B. 363, 81st Leg., Ist Sess. (Neb. 1975);
(7) L.B. 464, 79th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 1973); and
(8) L.B. 860, 77th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 1971).
45. 77 Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. 83 (1981-1982). See also 105 Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. 2178
(1981-1982); 44 Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. 62 (1977-1978); 172 Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. 258
(1977-1978); 5 Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. 5 (1975-1976); 40 Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. 43
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under the Nebraska Constitution.
The last anti-corporate family farm bill advanced in Nebraska
prior to the proposal of Initiative 300 was L.B. 184.46 L.B. 184 gener-
ally restricted any corporation other than a family farm or ranch
corporation or an "authorized corporation"4 7 from directly or indi-
rectly obtaining any interest in farm or ranch real estate or from
engaging in the farming or ranching business in Nebraska.4 The
Nebraska Attorney General rendered an opinion on the propriety
of L.B. 184 which concluded:
We have variously stated that this type of legislation involves an improper
and invalid legislative classification of corporations, that this type of legis-
lation involves an improper overextension of the Legislature's police
power, and that this type of legislation is in contravention of Article XII,
Section 1, and Article I, Section 18 of the Nebraska Constitution pertain-
ing to special laws. We have reviewed LB 184 in light of our various earlier
opinions and we have determined that LB 184 raises the same constitu-
tional concerns as we expressed earlier.
4 9
Article XII, section 1, of the Nebraska Constitution in part estab-
lishes that, "[t] he Legislature shall provide by general law for the
organization, regulation, supervision and general control of all cor-
porations, . . . No corporations shall be created by special
law .... 50 Additionally, article I, section 18, of the Nebraska
Constitution states that the legislature shall not pass local or spe-
cial laws which grant "to any corporation, association, or individual
any special or exclusive privileges."5 ' These "special laws"
clauses of the Nebraska Constitution are similar in impact to the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,5 2 and as a
result have been viewed by the legislature as the greatest barriers
(1975-1976); 116 Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. 159 (1973-1974); 86 Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. 201
(1971-1972); 118 Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. 275 (1971-1972).
46. L.B. 184, 87th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 1981).
47. Id. L.B. 184 allowed "authorized" nonfamily corporations which were not in-
cluded in the drafting of Initiative 300. An "authorized" corporation was basi-
caliy a Subchapter S Corporation allowing up to ten residents of Nebraska to
join as stockholders to buy land to engage in farming or ranching. For a dis-
cussion of the inevitable effects of Initiative 300 upon Subchapter S Corpora-
tions, see infra text accompanying notes 230-34. See also TRANSCIPT OF THE
PUBLIc HEARING ON THE L.B. 184 BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE
AND ENVIRONMENT, 87th Leg., 1st Sess. 44 (Neb. 1981) (Comments of Senator
Burrows).
48. L.B. 184, 87th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 1981).
49. 77 Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. 83 (1981-1982).
50. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 1; see infra Appendix 1.
51. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 18.
52. See 40 Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. 43 (1975-1976) where the Attorney General states:
"The equal protection clause, particularly, involves classification substan-
tially indistinguishable from the classification questions involved in Article
III, Section 18 of the Nebraska Constitution." Id. at 44.
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to enacting any type of corporate farming restrictions. 53
The persistence of the proponents who regularly submitted pro-
53. Note, however, that a related bill, the Corporate Reporting Act of 1975, was
enacted into law as NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-501 (1976). Section 3 of the Corpo-
rate Reporting Act requires:
After the effective date of this act, each corporation which has ac-
quired title to agricultural land or which has obtained any leasehold
interest or any other greater interest less than fee in any agricultural
land in this state shall, not later than January 1, 1976 and each year
thereafter, file with the Secretary of State a report containing the fol-
lowing information:
(1) The name of the corporation and its place of incorporation;
(2) The address of the registered office of the corporation in this
state, the name and address of its registered agent in this state, and
in the case of a foreign corporation, the address of its principal office
in its place of incorporation;
(3) The total acreage and location, listed by county, of all lots
and parcels of land in this state owned or leased by the corporation
and used for the growing of crops or the keeping or feeding of poultry
or livestock
(4) The names and addresses of the officers and members of the
board of directors and of all shareholders owning ten per cent or
more of the stock of the corporation;
(5) The percentage of the members of the board of directors who
are aliens;
(6) The name and address of each alien owning ten per cent or
more of its voting stock-
(7) The names and addresses of the executive officers and man-
agers of the corporation who are aliens;
(8) The name and address of each person residing on a farm or
actively engaged in farming and owning ten per cent or more of its
voting stock- and
(9) Any other information which the Secretary of State reason-
ably determines necessary to enforce the provisions of sections 76-
402 to 76-415, Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska, 1943.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1503 (1976). Additionally, § 6 of the Corporate Reporting
Act declares:
Each corporation which fails to submit a report, as required by
this act, or which willfully submits false, fraudulent, or misleading
information on any report shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall,
upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine of not more than one
thousand dollars.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1506 (1976). The effectiveness of this Act is limited since
there is no provision for funds to be allocated to the Secretary of State's office
to enable it to enforce the reporting requirement. The Secretary of State's
office merely files the reports as it receives them and nothing more is done.
Recent studies conducted by Dr. Bruce Johnson reveal that the data accumu-
lated pursuant to the Act in 1980 was insufficient to be viewed as representa-
tive due to a very low incidence of reporting in that year. CARRIKER, JOHNSON,
& BAKER, A LOOK AT CORPORATIONS IN FARDINmG N NEBRASKA (January, 1983)
(manuscript in process). Poor corporate reporting performance and the ab-
sence of a reporting enforcement requirement will certainly hamper the en-
forcement of Initiative 300 by the Secretary of State. See NEB. CONST. art.
XII, § 8, cl. 1; see infra Appendix 1.
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posed family farm legislation5 4 was partly due to the adoption of
family farm acts in eight other midwest states.55 While the family
farm acts are not identical and all have been amended several
times, 5 6 they all possess common elements. 7 Generally, corpora-
tions are forbidden to own or operate agricultural land in
Oklahoma,58 Kansas,5 9 Minnesota, 60 Wisconsin,6 1 South Dakota,62
Iowa,63 Missouri,64 and North Dakota. 65 These statutes principally
seek to: (1) prevent monopolization through corporate conglomer-
ates; (2) promote the economic growth of small, owner-operated
farms and family farms; (3) encourage stability and moral well-be-
ing of surrounding rural communities; and (4) nurture the free-en-
terprise system. 66 Each of the eight statutes prohibit corporations
from owning agricultural land used for farming and from engaging
in farming. Each of the eight states also provide for exemptions
for certain kinds of corporations, such as corporations with a spec-
ified number of shareholders (ranging from five to twenty-five) and
corporations in which a majority of the shareholders are related in
some way.67 North Dakota's original statute68 is the only one of
54. Senator Burrows, now retired, was the major promoter of anti-corporate
farming bills in Nebraska's unicameral from 1975 to 1981.
55. See supra note 5.
56. It is not within the scope of this Note to compare the various provisions of the
other states' corporate farming statutes. For comparative studies, see Note,
North Dakota's Corporate Farming Statute: An Analysis of the Recent
Change in the Law, 58 N.D.L REV. 283 (1982) [hereinafter cited as North Da-
kota's Statute], which discusses North Dakota's new law allowing North Da-
kota's farmers and ranchers to incorporate if they meet and maintain certain
requirements. North Dakota, prior to this new law, had prohibited all corpo-
rations from "acquiring or holding real estate." 1933 N.D. Sess. Laws 494, § 1.
See also Phelps, supra note 38.
57. See Phelps, supra note 38.
58. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 951-956 (West Supp. 1981-1982) (enacted in 1971).
59. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-5901 to -5902 (1974) (enacted in 1973).
60. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.24 (West Supp. 1982) (enacted in 1973).
61. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 182.001 (West Supp. 1981-1982) (enacted in 1973).
62. S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 47-9A-1 to -23 (Supp. 1982) (enacted in 1974).
63. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 172C.1 to .15 (West Supp. 1981-1982) (enacted in 1975).
64. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 350.015 (Vernon Supp. 1982) (enacted in 1975).
65. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-06-01 to -15 (Supp. 1981) (enacted in 1981).
66. See North Dakota's Statute, supra note 56; Phelps, supra note 38; see also
Morrison, State Corporate Farm Legislation, 7 U. ToL L. REv. 961 (1976).
67. See North Dakota's Statute, supra note 56; Phelps, supra note 38; see also
Morrison, State Corporate Farm Legislation, 7 U. ToL L. REV. 961 (1976).
68. The original North Dakota Farming Law was embodied within N.D. REv.
CODE § 10-0601 to -0606 (1943) (repealed 1981), and the original corporate
farming bill was 1933 N.D. S.ss. LAws 494, which was amended twice before it
was revised in 1943. The original North Dakota Farming Law prohibited all
corporations, whether domestic or foreign, from engaging in farming or agri-
culture. The law had an escheat provision whereby any corporation which
had purchased land for farming or agriculture after July 19, 1932 would have
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these laws to have ever had its constitutional validity reviewed by
the Supreme Court of the United States.
The North Dakota statute was reviewed by the United States
Supreme Court, in 1945, in Asbury Hospital v. Cass County.69 Prior
to the adoption of the North Dakota statute, Asbury Hospital, a
nonprofit Minnesota corporation, had acquired North Dakota agri-
cultural land due to a mortgage foreclosure. Asbury Hospital at-
tempted to divest itself of the farmland, which was leased to
farmers at the time of the suit, but argued that it should not have
to sell the land within the statutory ten-year divestiture period, es-
tablished under the subsequently adopted corporate farming law,
because it was not possible during that time period to sell the land
at a profit.7 0 In seeking a declaratory judgment, the hospital
claimed that the Corporate Farming Law was in violation of the
due process7 ' and equal protection clauses7 2 of the fourteenth
amendment. The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the
decision of the North Dakota Supreme Court upholding the valid-
ity of the statute, noting that a foreign corporation 73 was not guar-
anteed the recovery of its investment under the due process
clause: "[i]t is enough that the corporation ... is afforded a fair
opportunity to realize the value of the land, and that the sale, when
required, is to be under conditions reasonably calculated to realize
its value at the time of sale."7 4
In response to Asbury Hospital's equal protection claim, the
Supreme Court stated that the "Fourteenth Amendment does not
ten years to dispose of the land or else the land would escheat to the state in
order to be sold at public auction. Proceeds of that sale were then to be paid
to the corporation.
69. 326 U.S. 207 (1945). The constitutionality of the North Dakota Corporate
Farming Law was first tested in Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 72 N.D. 359,
7 N.W.2d 438 (1943); and in Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 73 N.D. 469, 16
N.W.2d 523 (1944). The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the Act vio-
lated neither the North Dakota nor the United States Constitutions. This de-
cision was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court on very narrow
grounds. See Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207 (1945). See infra
text accompanying notes 184-88 for a discussion of the narrow holding of the
United States Supreme Court inAsbury. See also supra note 32, forAsbury's
discussion of escheat provisions.
70. 326 U.S. at 210.
71. 326 U.S. at 212. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is
quoted supra note 32. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
72. 326 U.S. at 214. No argument was made that the statute was in violation of the
commerce clause; therefore, that issue has not been decided by the Supreme
Court. 326 U.S. at 210. See supra note 32 concerning consideration of impact
of Initiative 300 on the commerce clause.
73. "Foreign corporation" means any corporation not domesticated within the
State of Nebraska.
74. 326 U.S. at 212-13.
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deny to the state power to exclude a foreign corporation from do-
ing business or acquiring or holding property within it."75 There-
fore, the Court concluded there was no violation of the equal
protection clause:
The legislature is free to make classifications in the application of a
statute which are relevant to the legislative purpose. The ultimate test of
validity is not whether the classes differ but whether the differences be-
tween them are pertinent to the subject with respect to which the classifi-
cation is made.7 6
Wisconsin's corporate farming statute has also survived an at-
tack based on the equal protection clause in Lehndorff Geneva, Inc.
v. Warren.77 In Lehndorff, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
a Wisconsin statute did not violate the equal protection provisions
of the federal and Wisconsin constitutions by making it unlawful
for a nonresident alien,78 or a corporation or association having
more than 20% of its stock owned by nonresident aliens, to acquire
or own more than 640 acres of land in Wisconsin.79
In 1975, faced with several unsuccessful attempts to adopt simi-
lar corporate farming acts in Nebraska,80 a group of Nebraska leg-
75. 326 U.S. at 211.
76. 326 U.S. at 214.
77. 246 N.W.2d 815 (Wis. 1974).
78. "Alien" refers to any investor who is not a resident of the State of Nebraska.
79. 246 N.W.2d at 825. The other cases which involve the corporate farming laws
generally raise issues interpreting the various parts of the different state
laws. See Coal Harbor Stock Farm, Inc. v. Meier, 191 N.W.2d 583 (N.D. 1971),
where the North Dakota Supreme Court found that the corporate farming
statute's broad provision against corporate farming "prohibits all corpora-
tions, except the qualified cooperative corporations, from engaging in the
business of farming or agriculture," (N.D. CENT. CODE, § 10-06-01 (1976)) i.e.,
the intent of the statute was not to solely prohibit those corporations whose
main lifeline was other than farming or ranching, it was to prohibit all un-
qualified corporations. 191 N.W.2d at 588. See also LeForce v. Bullard, 454
P.2d 297 (Okla. 1969). For a brief discussion of LeForce, see supra note 6. One
more North Dakota case construing its statutory provisions is Loy v. Kessler,
39 N.W.2d 260 (N.D. 1949), where the North Dakota Supreme Court again in-
terpreted the old statute which was subsequently repealed, see supra note 68,
establishing that-
[T] he act does not expressly prohibit corporations from acquiring ti-
tle to farm lands....
... Escheat can apply only to lands to which the corporation has
acquired title .... It excludes the hypothesis that a grant of farm
land to the corporation is void. In that event there could be no es-
cheat. The grant is valid but the property becomes subject to
escheat.
39 N.W.2d at 272. For further discussion of escheat provisions, see supra note
32. Additionally, there is one case in Missouri which was first filed in 1976 and
is still pending: State of Mo., ex rel. Ashcroft v. Lehndorff Geneva, Inc., No.
29, 884 (Cir. Ct. (Cole Cty.) Mo. 1976).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 44-53.
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islators sought to place a constitutional amendment on the ballot
to circumvent the constitutional prohibitions to such legislation
which had been identified by the Nebraska Attorney General.8 1
The text of the proposed amendment in 1975 proclaimed that "[n] o
corporation, domestic or foreign, shall engage in the business of
farming or agriculture, except the Legislature shall exempt family
farm corporations and may exempt such other corporations as
they determine to be in the best interest of the state."8 2 The Attor-
ney General's opinion discussing this proposed amendment rea-
soned that if the amendment was adopted it might be able to
withstand charges of violations to the Nebraska Constitution,8 3 but
would "not eliminate the question of possible violations of the Fed-
eral Constitution." 84 The Attorney General wrote:
[W] e are of the opinion that even the United States Supreme Court might
have difficulty in finding a rational basis upon which to sustain the pro-
posed amendment [against equal protection claims]. As we have said
before, it is very difficult for us to detect any public evil in having agricul-
tural products produced by corporations.
8 5
The opinion went on to express concern about the divergent classi-
fications which could arise from legislative determinations con-
cerning which corporations should be restricted according to what
"they determine to be in the best interest of the state."86 The At-
torney General concluded that:
[W]e believe that our Supreme Court may well find the same classifica-
tion problems with this proposed amendment in the context of the Four-
teenth Amendment as we foresaw with respect to previous bills in the
context of the Nebraska Constitution. The United States Supreme Court
is somewhat more liberal than our court in these matters, but we would
anticipate that there would be some difficulty in sustaining this amend-
ment even before that Court.8
7
Initiative 300 similarly contains a great number of classifica-
tions, which go well beyond the scope of the classifications envi-
sioned by the proposed constitutional amendment in 1975. The
large number of special exclusions in Initiative 300 create legisla-
tive classifications which are of questionable constitutional valid-
81. See supra Attorney General Opinions at note 45. While not within the scope
of this Note, arguments may exist that a state constitutional amendment in
violation of other provisions of that same constitution can be found unconsti-
tutional on a state basis. See Note, Judicial Review of Initiative Constitu-
tional Amendments, 14 U.C.D. L REv. 461, 485-86 (1980).
82. 40 Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. 43 (quoting Resolution 8, a proposed Section 8 amend-
ment to Article XII of the Nebraska State Constitution).
83. Id. at 43.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 44.
86. Id. at 43 (quoting proposed Resolution 8).
87. Id. at 45.
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ity.88 Part III of this article will evalute those classifications and
their validity under the fourteenth amendment, following a discus-
sion of the United States Supreme Court's modern reading of the
equal protection clause.
I. THE EQUAL PROTECTION THEORIES OF THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT
One of the principal restrictions on the regulatory power of the
states is the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment,
which provides that a state shall not "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 89 A
corporation is considered a person9 O within the meaning of the due
process 9 ' and equal protection 92 clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The Supreme Court, in the Civil Rights Cases,93 declared
that a prerequisite for all challenges brought under the fourteenth
amendment is "state action."94 Thus, persons are protected from
irrational governmental action at the state level by the fourteenth
amendment. While this constitutional limitation does not guaran-
tee that the law must be applied to all persons equally, it does re-
quire rationality in the application of the law to individual
88. See infra text accompanying notes 191-93 relating to the corporate businesses
which Initiative 300 allows.
89. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
90. In Fulton Market Cold Storage Co. v. Cullerton, 582 F.2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1978),
the court stated:
While a corporation is not a "citizen" within the meaning of the privi-
leges and immunities clause [and thereby not eligible for its protec-
tions], Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496,
59 S.Ct. 954,83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939); Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 561,
19 S.Ct. 281, 43 L.Ed. 552 (1899); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall) 168,
19 L.Ed. 357 (1868); see also Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, N.D., 326
U.S. 207, 66 S.Ct. 61, 90 L.Ed. 6 (1945), a corporation is a "person"
within the meaning of the equal protection and due process of law
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936); Adams v. City of
Park Ridge, 293 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1961); Advocates for Arts v. Thomp-
son, 532 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1976); Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc.
v. Rice, 417 F.Supp. 1352 (3-Judge Dist. Ct. W.D. Wis. 1976).
582 F.2d at 1079.
91. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See supra note 32 for quotation of the due pro-
cess clause.
92. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
93. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
94. "State action" refers to the official actions of any state legislature, executive
officer, court or governmental agency and any local governmental subdivision
thereof. See generally Glennon & Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Four-
teenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 Sup. CT. REv. 221 (1976).
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persons.95 Furthermore, a settled principal of law in the courts of
this nation recognizes "that the sovereignty of the people is sub-
ject to constitutional limitations just as are legislative enact-
ments .... For that reason the initiative is necessarily subject to
the same scrutiny that it would be had it been adopted by the leg-
islature."96 The Supreme Court has declared that "[a] citizen's
constitutional rights can hardly be infringed upon simply because
a majority of the people choose that it [sic] be."9 7 Initiative 300, a
95. Justice Blackmun in Regents of University of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978) approvingly acknowledged the inequality of application of some laws
when he wrote:
It is worth noting, perhaps, that governmental preference has not
been a stranger to our legal life. We see it in veterans' preferences.
We see it in the aid to handicapped programs. We see it in the pro-
gressive income tax. We see it in the Indian programs.
Id. at 406.
96. Seattle School Dist. v. Wash., 473 F. Supp. 997, 1011-12, (W.D. Wash. 1979)
(paraphrasing Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392) ('The sovereignty of the
people is itself subject to those constitutional limitations which have been
duly adopted and remain unrepealed."). See Snyder, The Proposed National
Initiative Amendment: A Participatory Perspective on Substantive Restric-
tions and Procedural Requirements, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 429 (1981). Snyder
comments that "[t]he Supreme Court has held that the Initiative power of
state electorates is subject to constitutional limitation to the same extent as
the legislative power of the representative assemblies." Id. at 435. See also
Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 259, 413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966), a "d,
387 U.S. 369 (1967), where the court pointed out:
Where the state can be said to act, as it does of course, through laws
approved by legislators elected by the popular vote, it must also be
held to act through a law adopted directly by the popular vote. When
the electorate assumes to exercise the law-making function, then the
electorate is as much a state agency as any of its elected officials.
Id. at 542, 413 P.2d at 834, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 890. See also City of Eastlake v.
Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S.
385 (1969); Lucas v. 44th Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964); West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Seattle School
Dist. v. Wash., 437 F. Supp. 996 (W.D. Wash. 1979); Hall v. St. Helena Parish
School Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961), affd., 368 U.S. 515 (1962). See
generally Comment, Proposition 1 and Federal Protection of State Constitu-
tional Rights, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 685 (1980-81) [hereinafter cited as Proposition
1 ]; Barrett, The Rational Basis of Standard for Equal Protection Review of
Ordinary Legislative Classifications, 68 KY. L.J. 845 (1979-80); Bice, Stan-
dards of Judicial Review Under the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses, 50 S. CAL. L REV. 689 (1977).
97. Lucas v. 44th Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 736-37 (1964). See also City
of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 676 (1976) ("If the
substantive result of the referendum is arbitrary and capricious, bearing no
relation to the police power, then the fact that the voters of Eastlake wish it
so would not save the restriction."); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bar-
nette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) ("One's... fundamental rights may not be sub-
mitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections."); Hall v. St.
Helena Parish School Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649, 659 (E.D. La. 1961), aFfd, 368 U.S.
515 (1962) ("No plebiscite can legalize an unjust discrimination."). See gener-
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direct enactment of law by the people of Nebraska, is therefore
subject to the same constitutional constraints under the equal pro-
tection clause as acts of the legislature.S8
A. The Three Tiers of Scrutiny
The Supreme Court's analysis of the equal protection clause
has been described as a tripartite or three-tier approach.99 The top
tier examines the rationality of legislation under strict scrutiny
and is invoked when any legislation violates a fundamental right of
a certain class or unduly burdens a suspect class without a "com-
pelling state interest" to justify the classification.100 Recently,
commentators have asserted that the Court is analyzing equal pro-
tection concerns under a "newer" intermediate scrutiny stan-
dard.l1l Under this second tier, or intermediate scrutiny, 0 2
legislative classifications such as those based on gender are stud-
ied to determine whether or not they are substantially related to
ally Snyder, supra note 96, at 435; Proposition 1, supra note 96, at 733; Note,
The Application of the Equal Protection Clause to Referendum- Made Law:
James v. Valtierra, 1972 U. Itt. L.F. 408, 409 n.8 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Referendums ].
98. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. One commentator noted:
Without exception, courts should only entertain state or federal
constitutional challenges to the merits of an amendment in post-elec-
tion litigation. Such issues become ripe for decision only after the
electorate approves the amendment in question .... After the elec-
tion, however, courts must actively assure that constitutional rights
have not been vitiated through the initiative process.
Comment, Judicial Review of Initiative Constitutional Amendments, 14
U.C.D. L. REv. 461, 490 (1980) (citations omitted) [hereinafter cited as Initia-
tive Amendments].
99. For full analysis of the three-tier approach to equal protection, see Broderick,
The Nature of the Constitutional Process: Equal Protection and the Burger
Court, 12 N.C. CENT. L.J. 320, 351-52 (1981); Karasik, Equal Protection of the
Law Under the Federal and Illinois Constitutions: A Contrast in Unequal
Treatment, 30 DE PAUL L. REV. 263, 266-70 (1981); Bice, supra note 96, at 871-
72.
100. Id. The top tier strictly scrutinizes any legislation which impinges upon sus-
pect classes such as race or national origin. See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432
U.S. 1 (1977) (State classifications based on alienage are inherently suspect
and therefore are subject to strict judicial scrutiny).
101. See the analysis of the "newer" standard of equal protection in Gunther, In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972). An example of the newer stan-
dard is established in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). The Supreme Court
in Boren revealed that to be constitutionally valid, "classifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially re-
lated to achievement of those objectives." 429 U.S. at 197 (emphasis sup-
plied). See also infra note 106.
102. Id.
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an important state interest. 0 3 A third or lower tier of minimal
scrutiny of equal protection inquires whether legislative classifica-
tions bear a rational relation to a legitimate state interest.104
Initiative 300 does not appear to involve either of the top two
tiers of scrutiny since there is no classification scheme which in-
fringes on a fundamental interest or a suspect classification; nor is
there a classification within the Initiative based on a protected
characteristic such as gender.0 5 Therefore, an inquiry into the
constitutionality of Initiative 300 will be founded upon the lower
tier of scrutiny: do the classifications in Initiative 300 bear a ra-
tional relation to a legitimate interest of the State of Nebraska?
B. Minimal Scrutiny-The Rational Relationship Test
Until recently, equal protection review under the minimal scru-
tiny standard has had little judicial significance and, in practice,
has served as little more than a phrase which the Supreme Court
mouthed, masking a "mere tautological recognition of the fact that
Congress did what it intended to do."106 Many of the Court's prior
decisions have suggested that a legislative enactment must be up-
held "if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to jus-
tify"107 the statute's discrimination, thereby granting nearly
unlimited deference to the judgment of the legislative body which
enacted the legislation.108 However, this "rubber-stamp" method
103. See Broderick, supra note 99, at 351-52; Karasik, supra note 99, at 266-70; Bar-
rett, supra note 96, at 871-72. The middle tier requires that constitutionally
valid legislative classifications in areas such as gender (a less suspect class)
be substantially related to an important state interest. See, e.g., Wengler v.
Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (Statutes requiring widowers
but not widows to prove dependency on spouse to receive benefits at death of
spouse is not substantially related to an important state goal).
104. Id.
105. For a discussion concerning the protected status of certain family relation-
ships and the higher level of judicial scrutiny such status has received, see
supra note 32 for a discussion of Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1976).
106. U.S. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 180 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Similarly, Professor Gunther, in 1972, discovered that "[a]fter
an era during which the 'mere rationality' requirement symbolized virtual ju-
dicial abdication, the Court - following personnel changes in a non-interven-
tionist direction - has suddenly found repeated occasions to intervene on
the basis of the deferential standards. Moreover, that trend has remarkably
widespread support on the Court." Gunther, supra note 101, at 19. See also
Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and
Democratic Theory, 67 CALIF. L. RE V. 1049, 1056 (1979).
107. McGown v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
108. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981), where the dissent explains that
some deference to legislative decisions is proper, however, "[a] scertainment
of actual purpose to the extent feasible . . . remains an essential step in
equal protection." Id. at 245, n. 6 (dissenting opinion).
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of legislative analysis has arguably been fading in recent years as a
new analytical model' 09 has emerged which gives substance and
meaning to the minimal scrutiny review. Four recent Supreme
Court cases identify this new and intensified method of applying
the rationality test to challenged legislation: U.S. Railroad Retire-
ment Board v. Fritz,110 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. ,"
Schweiker v. Wilson,112 and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. 113
1. U.S. Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz
On December 9, 1980, the Supreme Court in Fritz,114 in a seven-
to-two decision, held that the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974115
was not violative of the equal protection clause of the United
States Constitution.116 The 1974 Act, replacing similar legislation
enacted in 1937,117 withdrew various social security and railroad re-
tirement benefits, which had been guaranteed under the previous
legislation, from a certain class of employees based on their lack of
connection with the railroad as of 1974 or their later retirement
date. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the majority in a
terse and sarcastic manner,"18 stating: "[w] here, as here, there are
plausible reasons for Congress' action, our inquiry is at an
end.... [T]his Court has never insisted that a legislative body
articulate its reason for enacting a statute. This is particularly true
where the legislature must necessarily engage in a process of line
109. In acknowledging the new model, Professor Gunther claims that "[tihe
model requires that there be an affirmative relation between means and ends
- or, in more traditional equal protection terms, that there be a genuine dif-
ference in terms of the state's objective between the group within the classifi-
cation and those without." Gunther, supra note 101, at 47.
110. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
111. 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
112. 450 U.S. 221 (1981). As Professor Leedes noted, Schweiker, Fritz, and Clover
Leaf "disclose that several Justices are no longer prepared to defer exces-
sively to the legislature's classifications when the legislation does not identify
its purposes. This is a significant shift, a departure from the minimum ration-
ality test of the Warren Court period, which amounted to a meaningless rit-
ual." Leedes, The Rationality Requirement of the Equal Protection Clause, 42
OHIO ST. L.J. 639, 640 (1981).
113. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
114. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
115. Pub. L. No. 93-445, 88 Stat. 1305 (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 231-231t (1976)).
116. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
117. Act of June 24, 1937, ch. 382, 75 Stat. 307 (1937).
118. Justice Rehnquist's harsh criticism of Justice Brennan's dissent states: "The
comments in the dissenting opinion about the proper cases for which to look
for the correct statement of the equal protection rational basis standard, and
about which cases limit earlier cases, are just that: comments in a dissenting
opinion." 449 U.S. at 176, n.10. See also Justice Stevens' concurring opinion
which draws attention to and mediates Justice Rehnquist's footnote. 449 U.S.
at 180 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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drawing."119 However, Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Mar-
shall joined, delivered a strong dissent in which he criticized the
majority's interpretation and application of the rational basis test
and emphasized the propriety of the judical evolution of a more
demanding standard of review, which should be utilized more uni-
formly by the Court in evaluating equal protection cases.12 0
Justice Brennan's standard of review foretold the new analyti-
cal approach to equal protection cases which would in essence be
used by a majority of the Court in Clover Leaf and Schweiker, both
rendered within three months of Fritz. 12 1 Justice Brennan rea-
soned that:
[B]y presuming purpose from result, the Court reduces analysis to tautol-
ogy. It may always be said that Congress intended to do what it in fact
did. If that were the extent of our analysis, we would find every statute, no
matter how arbitrary or irrational, perfectly tailored to achieve its pur-
pose. But, equal protection scrutiny under the rational basis test requires
the courts first to deduce the independent objectives of the statute, usu-
ally from statements of purpose and other evidence in the statute and leg-
islative history, and second to analyze whether the challenged
classification rationally furthers achievement of those objectives. The
Court's tautological approach will not suffice.
1 2 2
Citing substantial authority, Justice Brennan went on to conclude
that the Court should no longer sustain challenged legislation
merely by relying on conceivable justifications hypothesized by
the Court or by government attorneys.123 "A challenged classifica-
tion may be sustained only if it is rationally related to achievement
of an actual legitimate governmental purpose.' 24
119. 449 U.S. at 179.
120. Id. at 182-98 (dissenting opinion).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 187 (dissenting opinion). Professor Gunther foresaw this change in
equal protection almost ten years prior to Justice Brennan's dissent. Gun-
ther exclaimed:
Putting consistent new bite into the old equal protection would
... have the Court assess the means in terms of legislative purposes
that have substantial basis in actuality, not merely in conjecture.
Moreover, it would have the Justices gauge the reasonableness of
questionable means on the basis of materials that are offered to the
Court, rather than resorting to rationalizations created by perfunc-
tory judicial hypothesizing.
This relatively vigorous scrutiny would be more interventionist
than the Warren Court's applications of old equal protection formu-
las .... [I]t would concern itself solely with means, not ends.
Gunther, supra note 101, at 21. See also Leedes, supra note 112, at 645.
123. 449 U.S. at 188 (dissenting opinion).
124. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). For further evidence of
the re-emergence of an appropriate standard of review, see Johnson v. Robi-
son, 415 U.S. 361, 374-75 (1974). Professor Leedes has determined that the
Fritz debate "indicates that several Justices are reconsidering what for de-
cades has been a fiction: the desirability of a rationality requirement that
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2. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.
Just over a month following the Fritz decision, Justice Brennan
delivered the majority opinion in Clover Leaf,125 in which Justice
Powell concurred in part and dissented in part, Justice Stevens
dissented, and Justice Rehnquist took no part. In Clover Leaf,
the Court upheld a Minnesota statute which was intended to pro-
tect the environment from nonreturnable plastic milk containers
and to conserve energy. The statute did not affect paperboard car-
tons of milk. In his opinion, Justice Brennan was able to clearly
establish the rational basis test he advocated in Fritz as the rule of
the majority. While the statute in question was held not to violate
the equal protection clause, the Supreme Court examined the pur-
poses and objectives of the Act as articulated by the legislature in
the first section of the statute and found them to be legitimate
state purposes. "Thus the controversy [in Clover Leaf] centers on
the narrow issue whether the legislative classification between
plastic and nonplastic nonreturnable milk containers is rationally
related to achievement of the statutory purposes."'126
3. Schweiker v. Wilson
On March 4, 1981, Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the
Court in Schweiker.12 7 In a five-to-four decision, the Court ruled
that the distinction made by Congress "between residents in pub-
lic institutions receiving Medicaid funds for their care, and resi-
dents in such institutions not receiving Medicaid funds,"128 did not
unconstitutionally violate the plaintiffs' equal protection rights by
denying them supplementary benefits. Justice Blackmun, deliver-
ing the opinion of the Court, set forth the test to be used in evaluat-
ing the legislation: "As long as the classificatory scheme chosen by
Congress rationally advances a reasonable and identifiable gov-
ernmental objective, we must disregard the existence of other
methods of allocation that we, as individuals, perhaps would have
preferred."12 9 Justice Blackmun then undertook an examination
of the legislative history of the questioned statutes and concluded
that the legislative record, while sparse, unmistakably identified a
Congressional objective for the disputed classifications. Justice
Blackmun further concluded that that objective was reasonable
demands reasoned explanations justifying challenged classifications."
Leedes, supra note 112, at 655.
125. 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
126. Id. at 462-63.
127. 450 U.S. 221 (1981).
128. Id. at 232-33.
129. Id. at 235.
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and rationally advanced by the statutory scheme.130 Although Jus-
tice Brennan, along with Justices Marshall and Stevens, joined in
the dissent written by Justice Powell,' 3 ' the dispute with the ma-
jority centered not on the need to search for identifiable govern-
mental objectives under the rational basis standard, but rather on
the conclusions reached, after an evaluation of the statute's legis-
lative history, 32 as to what those identifiable objectives were. Af-
ter examining the legislative record, Justice Powell concluded:
"Neither the structure of [the legislation] nor its legislative history
identifies or even suggests any policy plausibly intended to be
served by denying appellees the small [benefits ]."133 It appears
clear that the Court in Schweiker utilized Justice Brennan's ana-
lytical approach to identifying and examining actual legislative
purposes, even though the ultimate purposes identified by the
Court were contrary to Justice Brennan's independent
conclusions. 34
4. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.
Finally, on February 24, 1982, six of the Supreme Court Justices
agreed in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. that a classificatory
130. Id.
131. Id. at 239-47 (dissenting opinion).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 245 (dissenting opinion).
134. Justices Brennan and Powell also differed with the majority concerning the
intensity with which the Court should scrutinize the purpose of the legisla-
tion. Justice Powell wrote in his dissent that the Court should scrutinize fur-
ther "[w]hen no indication of legislative purpose appears other than the
current position of the Secretary, [and] the Court should require that the
classification bear a 'fair and substantial relation' to the asserted purpose."
450 U.S. at 244-45 (Powell, J., dissenting). Additionally, Justice Powell pro-
claimed that this is a higher standard of review: 'This marginally more de-
manding scrutiny indirectly would test the plausibility of the tendered
purpose, and preserve equal protection review as something more than 'a
mere tautological recognition of the fact that Congress did what it intended to
do."' Id. Professor Leedes agreed with Justice Powell and added:
The fate of the legislature should not depend on the Court's willing-
ness to participate in a sham. There is simply no reason why the
Court should cover for the legislature's failure to think things out,
nor is there a sound reason why courts should, on their own initia-
tive, explain that a law enacted to serve the interests of pressure
groups is a health-related or consumer protection measure.
Leedes, supra note 112, at 665. Furthermore, Professor Leedes also suggested
that the "rationality requirement . . . be applied with relatively vigorous,
means-focused scrutiny. Meaningful judicial scrutiny is unlikely to occur if
the Court continues to scan the Universe for imaginary ends .... Id. at 668.
See also Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) for further
justification for the Court's evaluation of actual legislative purposes when
evaluating questionable legislative classifications. Id. at 679-89.
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scheme involving claims for employment discrimination violated
the minimum rationality test of the equal protection clause.135
Logan filed a claim with the Illinois Fair Employment Practices
Commission (FEPC) against his employer, Zimmerman Brush
Company, alleging unlawful discharge from employment due to
his physical handicap.136 Although the claim was filed correctly
and in a timely manner, Logan was deprived of a hearing before
FEPC due to the failure of FEPC to commence a fact-finding proce-
dure within the statutory 120-day period.137 Justice Blackmun
wrote the opinion of the Court, holding that Logan had a protect-
able property interest in his right to use FEPC's hearing proce-
dures and that the inaction of FEPC in not processing Logan's
claim amounted to a denial of his due process rights.138
Logan also asserted that his rights to equal protection of the
laws had been violated.139 While the Court determined that Lo-
gan's claim could be decided in his favor solely upon due process
grounds, six of the Justices viewed the equal protection claim of
sufficient importance to merit additional discussion. In a separate
opinion offered by Justice Blackmun, with whom Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, and O'Connor joined, the 120-day class limitation in
FEPC was said to "unambiguously divide claims - and thus, nec-
essarily, claimants - into two discrete groups that are accorded
radically disparate treatment."' 40 The two discrete groups were
made up of those claimants whose claims were processed within
120 days and those whose identical claims were not processed
within 120 days.1 4 ' "In other words, the State converts similarly
situated claims into dissimilarly situated ones, and then uses this
distinction as the basis for its classification. This I believe is ihe
very essence of arbitrary state action."' 42 In concluding that the
legislative 120-day limitation period was invalid, Justice Blackmun
and the joining Justices utilized the Schweiker minimum rational
basis test to identify the actual purpose of the law, and then in-
quired whether or not the "legislation classif[ied] the persons it
affected in a manner rationally related to legitimate governmental
objectives.' 43 The four Justices also cited Fritz'4 4 for further sup-
135. 455 U.S. at 438 (Blackmun, J., separate opinion). The Court, though, chose to
base its ruling on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id.
136. 455 U.S. at 426-28.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 436-38.
139. Id. at 427.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 442.
143. Id. at 439 (quoting Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981)). For addi-
tional support of the Court's use of the modern rational basis test, see Tex-
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port of the methodology for finding this legislative classificatory
scheme irrational under "the lowest level of permissible equal pro-
tection scrutiny." 45
Justice Powell also wrote an opinion upon equal protection
grounds, with which Justice Rehnquist joined, which agreed that
the limitation period of FEPC failed to comport with a minimal
standard of equal protection review.146 Although Justice Powell
expressed concern about the Court's "broad pronouncements"' 47
on the law of procedural due process and equal protection and
stated that the case should be decided "narrowly on its unusual
facts,"'4 8 his analysis involved the identification of legislative pur-
poses asserted by the state and an evaluation of whether the statu-
tory scheme rationally promoted those purposes. Further, Justice
Powell cited Schweiker as authority for the application of the ap-
propriate equal protection test. 49 Even though Justices Powell
and Rehnquist refused to join Justice Blackmun's separate opin-
ion or to outwardly endorse the more demanding equal protection
test set forth therein, little more than a subtle distinction from Jus-
tice Blackmun's analytical approach can be detected in their
analysis. 5 0
While the Court confined its primary holding to issues of due
process, Logan demonstrates that a majority of the Justices are
willing to adopt a more meaningful interpretation of the rational
basis test to overturn arbitrary legislative classifications.' 5 ' This
line of cases indicates that the rational basis test for equal protec-
tion "is not a toothless one."' 5 2 It is apparent from Fritz, Clover
aco, Inc., v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982). See also Western and Southern Life
Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of CaL, 451 U.S. 648 (1981).
144. 455 U.S. at 441. The majority is citing the concurring opinion of Justice Ste-
vens in Fritz, where Justice Stevens, while agreeing with the conclusion of
the majority opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, sided with Justice Bren-
nan in criticizing Justice Rehnquist's analytical approach to the equal protec-
tion issues presented in this case. Justice Stevens commented in Fritz that:
Justice Brennan correctly points out that if the analysis of legislative
purpose requires only a reading of the statutory language in a dis-
puted provision, and if any "conceivable basis" for a discriminatory
classification will repel a constitutional attack on the statute, judicial
review will constitute a mere tautological recognition of the fact that
Congress did what it intended to do.
449 U.S. at 180.
145. 455 U.S. at 439.
146. 455 U.S. at 443 (Powell, J., joined by Rehnquist, J., concurring).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Compare Justice Blackmun's concurrence with Justice Powell's concurrence
in Logan, 455 U.S. at 441.
151. Id.
152. 450 U.S. at 234 (quoting Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976)). Profes-
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Leaf, Schweiker, and Logan that the Court is now utilizing a more
critical and less deferential review of questionable legislative clas-
sifications under the rational basis test of the equal protection
clause. It is through this modern analysis that the validity of Initi-
ative 300 will be evaluated.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE COURT'S EQUAL PROTECTION
ANALYSIS TO INITIATIVE 300
A. The Search for an Articulated Purpose
To apply the modern equal protection analysis, one must begin
by searching for an articulated and legitimate purpose for the
adoption of Initiative 300.153 However, the enactment of a body of
law by the initiative process 5 4 inherently obscures the purpose of
the amendment as well as the subjective intent of its propo-
nents. 5 5 The difficulty in determining whether there was an intent
to discriminate on the part of the voters does not, however, hold
sor Gunther's words in 1972 apply today in the newfound test with "bite" in
Clover Leaf and Schweiker: "Recent experience admonishes that it is un-
wise to dismiss puzzling [court] performances as judicial sports. And the re-
iterations of the rationality formulas are after all on the books and have some
claim to a life and momentum of their own." Gunther, supra note 101, at 36-37
(citations omitted).
153. See supra text accompanying notes 114-52 for a discussion of Fritz, Clover
Leaf, Schweiker, and Logan.
154. The power given to the people of the State of Nebraska to enact or reject
constitutional initiatives is embodied within NEB. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-4. The
electorate has rights to initiate constitutional (or legislative) changes and
submit these changes to the voters for their approval or rejection, while a
referendum differs from an initiative in that the legislation submitted to voter
approval has originated from and been passed by the legislature. See Refer-
endums, supra note 97, at 409 n.8; BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY, at 727, 967, 1112
(rev. 5th ed. 1979). Jean Jacques Rousseau believed the individual is sov-
ereign and that the only way to maintain political liberty was by continuous,
direct involvement in government by all citizens. See J. Rousseau, Contrat
Social (Paris, 1762); see also Note, Initiative and Referendum-Do They En-
courage or Impair Better State Government?, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 925 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Initiative and Referendum].
155. "Determining intent is difficult enough when a law has been enacted by a
state legislature. When one examines the motive of hundreds, thousands or
even millions of voters who cast their ballots in a referendum [or initiative]
the task is even more impracticable." Referendums, supra note 97, at 420.
Authority exists to suggest that some issues are too complex to be left to a
vote of the electorate. Leonard v. Bothel, 87 Wash. 2d 847, 851, 557 P.2d 1306,
1308 (1976) ("Administrative acts of municipal legislative bodies are not sub-
ject to referendum election.") Further, objections to direct legislation by the
voters have been based on a belief that the electorate has limited capacities
for:. long range perception; quality decisions; resources, time or motivation to
analyze and research issues. Snyder, supra note 96, at 450. See also Initiative
and Referendum, supra note 154, at 940.
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the majority vote beyond a judicial search for a rational purpose. 15 6
1. The Initiative Petition, Amendment, and Ballot Summary
The quest for a determination of the purposes of Initiative 300
leads beyond the electorate's mindset to many different political
and legal sources. The first obvious source, the Initiative petition
itself, 5 7 fails to delineate a purpose for the legislation. As certified
by the Nebraska Secretary of State, on March 2, 1982, the petition
stated: "[t]he object of this initiative petition is to prohibit non-
family corporations from further purchase of Nebraska farm and
ranch land, and to prohibit further establishment of nonfamily cor-
porate crop and livestock operations."l5 8 While this statement of
the Initiative's "object" summarizes what the actual implementa-
tion of the Initiative is designed to accomplish, it does not reveal
what public purpose or purposes are to be accomplished or ful-
filled by its implementation. 5 9 In other words, the petition de-
scribes what the Initiative is supposed to do but it does not
indicate why it is important, necessary, or legitimate to do so.
Under the modern means/end analysis of equal protection, pro-
moted by commentators160 and recently utilized by the United
States Supreme Court,161 the petition only delineated the means to
accomplish an otherwise undisclosed state end or purpose.
A similar conclusion is drawn from a review of the actual ballot
summary prepared for the Nebraska electorate162 as well as from a
review of the text of the amendment itself. 63 Neither document
contains the familiar preamble of a public purpose incorporated
within most state legislation. Therefore, the public documentation
of Initiative 300 fails to articulate a legitimate governmental or
public purpose for the amendment and requires an evaluation of
other available sources.
156. See Seattle School Dist. v. Wash., 473 F. Supp. 996 (W.D. Wash. 1979).
The fact that it is impossible to determine whether there was a...
discriminatory intent or purpose does not, however, relieve... [a]
court of the burden of determining whether there was in fact such an
intent or purpose behind the adoption of [the] Initiative .... One
must simply look elsewhere than within the minds of the voters.
Id. at 1014.
157. NEB. SEc'Y OF STATE, Initiative 300 Petition, Public Record, certified March 2,
1982.
158. Id. See also infra Appendix 1. The object of the Intitiative is not printed in
the text of the amendment as it appears in the Nebraska State Constitution,
at NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8, cl. 1.
159. Id.
160. See supra note 101.
161. See supra notes 89-152 and accompanying text.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 7-10.
163. See NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8, cl 1; see infra Appendix 1.
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2. Legislative Hearings
Some insight into the purposes of Initiative 300 can be drawn
from the transcript of the only official public hearing held on the
Initiative.164 The hearing took place on September 15, 1982 in front
of the Nebraska State Legislature's Committee on Banking, Com-
merce, and Insurance.16 5 Most of the Initiative's proponents chose
to boycott this hearing, apparently for political reasons. 166 Conse-
quently, the statements of support revealed in the hearing's trans-
cipt are largely confined to the opinions of a small group of
proponents.
The most vocal advocate of the Initiative, State Senator Bur-
rows, identified several factors which led to the effort to draft and
submit Initiative 300 to the electorate. The Senator's most clearly
articulated concern involved the perceived intrusion of large cor-
porations into the agricultural community of Nebraska. He argued
that this intrusion would perpetuate "concentrated ownership
where the individuals [could] no longer get it back."' 67 Senator
Burrows also stated that the Initiative's proponents feared the eco-
nomic power of the large corporations and felt that large corpora-
tions produced unfair competition for the family farmer.168
Further indications of purpose can be found in the legislative
hearings on previously proposed family farm legislation. Senator
Burrows noted at the Initiative 300 hearing169 that the origins of
Initiative 300 stemmed largely from the drafting of Legislative Bill
184 (L.B. 184) introduced in the Nebraska Legislature on January
14, 1981,170 and that the object of L.B. 184 was similar to the object
of Initiative 300. Legislative Bill 184 stated its underlying purposes
as "the efficient use of agricultural land ... encouraged by a sys-
tem of family farms, authorized farm corporations, and family
ranches . . ." upon which nonabsentee residents of Nebraska
lived, worked, and owned the land.'17 At the legislative hearing for
164. Initiative 300 Hearing, supra note 4, at 1.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 2. Most of the Initiative's proponents chose to boycott the hearing sup-
posedly to protest their displeasure with the Committee in front of which the
hearing was held since all previous hearings regarding proposed family farm
legislation had been held in the Agricultural Committee. Furthermore, the
Chairman of the Banking Committee, Senator DeCamp, was one of the lead-
ing opponents of family farm legislation which assuredly fueled the protes-
ters frustrations. Therefore, the main purposes to be gleaned from the
hearing supporting Initiative 300 result primarily from the comments of Sena-
tor Burrows, one of Initiative 300's chief proponents. Id.
167. Id. at 4.
168. Id. at 5.
169. Id. at 2.
170. LB. 184, 87th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 1981).
171. Id.
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L.B. 184, additional purposes were discussed, including the desires
to preserve the rural way of life, to prevent corporate entrapment
of Nebraska farmland, and to protect the land from perceived cor-
porate abuses in the area of conservation.172
3. Campaign Literature
A vast amount of campaign literature provides a final source for
discovering specific purposes of Initiative 300. Beyond the pur-
poses mentioned above, the campaign propaganda emotionally as-
serted that "corporations have no soul" and that the "small rural
towns without family farmers will go bankrupt and die."173 Drey
Samuelson, one of the principle organizers of the Initiative 300
campaign, criticized corporate investors in land, concluding that:
"[w] e have people investing in cattle these days that don't know
the difference between a steer and a steering wheel, and it is only
because of tax shelters."174
To summarize, the purposes of Initiative 300, as can best be de-
termined from the documented sources available, can be trans-
lated into three major principles. First, proponents felt that
Initiative 300 would protect small family farms from unfair compe-
tition which would result from the concentration of farmland own-
ership by large corporations.175 Second, the proponents voiced
fears of deterioration of the farming communities through absen-
tee ownership and viewed Initiative 300 as a mechanism to protect
the local economy by promoting personal involvement with the
farm in place of the "soulless" corporate farmer,176 thereby pre-
serving a way of life.177 Third, Initiative 300's proponents felt that
resource conservation would be promoted because of the belief
that corporate and partnership owned farms would not follow
sound conservation practices or endeavor to employ sound envi-
ronmental practices.178 With these three probable purposes estab-
172. Id. See also L.B. 837, 86th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 1980); Transcript of the Public
Hearing on L.B. 837 Before the Committee on Agriculture and Environment,
86th Leg., 1st Sess. 74 (Neb. 1980) [hereinafter cited as L.B. 837 Hearing].
173. Nebraska Union Farmer, October, 1982, at 3, col. 1. See also Speech by Drey
Samuelson, "Why a Nebraska Family Farmer Should Vote for Initiative 300"
(Fall, 1982); Advertisement: "Myth and Fact Concerning Initiative 300," run in
newspapers throughout the State of Nebraska (Fall, 1982) (Paid for by the
Committee to Preserve the Family Farm, Jann Douglas, Treasurer); Cam-
paign leaflet, "Yes on Initiative 300," circulated by Center for Rural Affairs,
Walthill, Nebraska (Fall, 1982) [hereinafter cited as "Yes on Initiative 300"].
174. Speech by Drey Samuelson, supra note 173 (emphasis in original).
175. See Initiative 300 Hearing, supra note 4, at 2-7.
176. Nebraska Union Farmer, October, 1982, at 3, col. 1.
177. "Nebraska the Good Life," motto of the State of Nebraska.
178. See L.B. 184, 87th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 1981); LB. 837, 86th Leg., 1st Sess.
(Neb. 1980); L.B. 837 Hearing, supra note 172.
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lished, it is possible to examine the validity of Initiative 300 by
determining whether the purposes behind the Initiative are legiti-
mate and whether Initiative 300 is a rational means for achieving
the desired result.
B. The Search for a Rational Relationship
1. The Nature of the Classifications
a. The Distinctions Between Related and Unrelated
Individuals
The operational aspect of Initiative 300 is subject to a litany of
classifications and exceptions. At the beginning of the text of the
amendment, the Initiative establishes that "[n]o corporation or
syndicate shall acquire, or otherwise obtain an interest, whether
legal, beneficial, or otherwise, in any title to real estate used for
farming or ranching in this state, or engage in farming or ranch-
ing."1 79 This blanket prohibition of corporate and syndicate farm-
ing is followed by a wealth of exceptions, including "a family farm
or ranch corporation,.., in which the majority of the voting stock
is held by members of a family, or a trust created for the benefit of
a member of that family"180 and "a limited partnership in which
the partners are members of a family, or a trust created for the
benefit of a member of that family."181 This is the most questiona-
ble of the many classifications, since it raises constitutional ques-
tions as a result of the distinctions drawn between the agricultural
activities in which related and unrelated persons may be engaged
through joint efforts in corporate or syndicate farm ownership and
operation.182 While related persons are not restricted, groups of
unrelated persons are forbidden to hold more than 49.9% of any
corporation and are precluded entirely from participating in lim-
ited partnerships for any type of farming or ranching. 8 3
Asbury Hospital v. Cass County184 was the case most fre-
quently cited by the proponents of Initiative 300 as evidence of the
amendment's constitutionality. The Supreme Court acknowl-
edged in Asbury that a state may entirely restrict foreign corporate
ownership of farmland 8 5 and may also recognize differences be-
tween corporations, thus allowing application of state policy
179. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8, cl. 1; see infra Appendix 1.
180. NEB. CONST. art XII, § 8, cl. 1(A); see infra Appendix 1.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. 326 U.S. 207 (1945). See also supra note 32 for Asbury's discussion of escheat
provisions and text accompanying notes 68-76 for further discussion of As-
bury's holding.
185. Id. at 211.
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against concentrated corporate farming.186 However, the Court's
ruling of constitutionality in Asbury is clearly distinguishable from
issues of constitutionality raised in Initiative 300. The classifying
mechanism in Initiative 300, unlike that used in Asbury, distin-
guishes between different kinds of individuals rather than differ-
ent types of corporations.187 Under Initiative 300, corporate
ownership is permitted as long as certain types of individuals own
the majority of the voting stock. Similarly, limited partnerships
are permitted as long as their partners are all of a particular char-
acter. The Initative differentiates between groups of individuals
similarly situated by allowing related persons to engage in various
activities while severely restricting the right of unrelated persons
to engage in the same activities. While Asbury permits a state to
exercise control over the activities of corporations wishing to exer-
cise the privilege of doing business within the boundaries of the
state, including the power to totally exclude foreign corporations
from exercising that privilege, it does not grant a state the author-
ity to create unreasonable distinctions or classifications among the
persons within its jurisdiction. This line-drawing between related
and unrelated groups of individuals, therefore, is fundamentally
different from the classifications addressed in Asbury and cannot
be justified under that case.188
b. Corporate Kin: Love to the Fourth Degree
A second major classification of suspect validity, the definition
of related persons, also relates to the family farm distinction. The
definition of the family farm corporation restricts majority stock
ownership to family members "related to one another within the
fourth degree of kindred according to the rules of civil law, or their
186. Id. at 214.
187. Id. See NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8, cl. I(A); see infra Appendix 1.
188. Similarly, in North Dakota Pharmacy Board v. Snyder Stores, 414 U.S. 156
(1973), the Supreme Court found a statute valid which required that a corpo-
ration applying for a permit to operate a pharmacy must have the majority of
stock owned by registered pharmacists. Id. at 167. While the Court seems to
be allowing a classification based on individual persons within a corporation,
these persons are not similarly situated. The Court justified the distinctions
of persons within the statute by pointing to the fact that selling drugs re-
quires a high degree of knowledge and expertise and that a stockholder who
was also a licensed pharmacist "would be more likely to observe the business
with an intelligent eye than a casual investor who looked only to the standing
of the stock in the market." 414 U.S. at 165-67 (quoting Liggett Co. v. Bal-
dridge, 278 U.S. 105, 114-15 (1928)). The Attorney General of Nebraska in 1975
considered Snyder in connection with the proposed family farm amendment
and said: "[w]e have been unable to detect any such justification [such as
the need for expertise] in the amendment under consideration." 40 Op. Neb.
Att'y Gen. 45 (1975-1976).
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spouses, at least one of whom is a person residing on or actively
engaged in the day-to-day labor and management of the farm or
ranch... ."189 Such a degree of consanguinity restricts corporate
and syndicate ownership to family members no more distantly re-
lated than first cousins.1 90 For example, corporate kin farming will
be valid as long as incorporated cousins do not die, leaving their
shares to their children.
c. Some Preferred Businesses
Finally, Initiative 300 contains an extensive list of unrestricted
corporations, which include: nonprofit corporations; poultry-rais-
ing corporations; alfalfa-producing corporations; nursery and sod
farm corporations; and custom-spraying, fertilizing, or harvesting
corporations.191 While these exceptions create additional ques-
tionable classifications, the discussion in this Note will center on
the more crucial questions192 surrounding the constitutional valid-
ity of the classifications between related and unrelated individuals
and the degree of consanguinity of family members required
under Initiative 300.193
189. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8, cl. 1(A); see infra Appendix 1.
190. See Consangunity Chart, infra Appendix 2. It should be noted that the re-
strictions on corporate ownership contradict and, thereby, necessarily are in
derogation of the Nebraska Business Corporation Act, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-
2001 -2080, 21-20,105, 21-20,139 (Cum. Supp. 1982), which states that every do-
mestic corporation shall be able: "To purchase, take, receive, lease, or other-
wise acquire, own, hold, improve, use and otherwise deal in and with, real, or
personal property, or any interest therein situated. . . ." Id. at § 21-2004(4).
191. NEB. CONsT. art. XlI, § 8, cls. 1(B), 1(F), 1(G), 1(H), and 1(M), respectively;
see infra Appendix 1. Note that Illinois invalidated its Sunday Closing Laws
due to their unequal effect on various businesses. See Karasik, supra note 99,
at 277.
192. The areas of concern to be discussed may be more crucial to Initiative 300's
well-being than the particular types of farming specifically excepted since a
judicial determination of unconstitutionality of the broader classifications
might render the Amendment void, whereas if the more particular classifica-
tions are found unconstitutional, a court might simply delete those sections
leaving the rest of the Initiative amendment in force.
193. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to protect all individual persons
and groups of individual persons.
If this were not so, only the perennial losers in the political process
would be entitled to equal protection of the laws. Over a century ago,
the Court realized that the Equal Protection Clause means more; it
"means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same
protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in the same place and under like circumstances."
Leedes, supra note 112, at 646-47 (quoting Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31
(1879)).
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2. Application of the Classifications to the State's Purposes
a. Protection of the Family Farm from Competition from
Large, Absentee Corporations
An enormous amount of public debate has centered around the
emotional perception that Nebraska agricultural land is being
swallowed up by corporations and limited partnerships. Concern
has been most vocal during the last ten to fifteen years due to an
evolving economy which has made investor ownership of farmland
desirable. Until the economic recession of the last two years, total
rates of return to investment in agriculture since 1965 have ex-
ceeded the rates of return to common stock and long-term
bonds.194 This phenomenon has been due largely to the substan-
tial capital gain realized in the farm sector from dramatically ap-
preciating land values. From 1970 to 1980, average farmland prices
nationwide rose over 300%.195 Moreover, ownership of farmland
has had numerous significant advantages, particularly for high in-
come individuals. High income landowners may obtain, among
other benefits, preferential tax treatment for capital gains on the
sale of farmland, investment tax credits in certain cases, interest
deductions on borrowed funds as a business expense, and acceler-
ated depreciation in certain instances. 96 While the lower income
farmer or investor also has access to these benefits, the benefits
are greatest to those in the highest tax brackets since they can re-
duce income which would normally be taxed at a higher rate. In
addition, the large investor will be able to apply these benefits to
income derived from other sources. 97
The fact that farmland has generally been a good investment
has deepened the desire for the purchase and expansion of farms
by farmers and nonfarmers alike.198 Nonfarmer investors in par-
ticular, through corporations and limited partnerships, have kin-
dled substantial controvery in Nebraska over the last decade.
Limited partnership investments have attracted perhaps the most
media attention in the last several years. The principal focus of
these partnership investments has been the substantial tax bene-
fits to be derived from the conversion of rangeland in the sandhills
and western portions of the state into crop producing land. The
194. STATUS OF THE FAMILy FARM: 1982, supra note 42, at 42.
195. SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSiNEss, U.S. SENATE, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., OWN-
ERSHIP AND CONTROL OF FARMLAND IN THE UNITED STATES, 13 (Comm. Print
1980) [hereinafter cited as OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL].
196. Id. at 14.
197. See generally J. JUERGENSMEYER & J. WALDOw, AGRICULTURAL LAw ch. 34
(1982).
198. STATUS OF THE FAMImy FARM: 1982, supra note 42, at 42.
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very dry and sandy soils in these areas have historically produced
vast amounts of native grasses ideal for livestock grazing.199 How-
ever, since the development of the center pivot irrigation system in
the mid-fifties, 200 knowledgeable farmers and farm managers have
been able to tap Nebraska's enormous underground water sup-
plies to transform these arid grazing ranges into lush fields of corn
and wheat. Investors have envisioned numerous financial benefits
from this conversion, including substantial increases in land val-
ues and significant tax benefits, in the form of investment tax cred-
its and depreciation, from the acquisition of center pivot irrigation
systems. 201
Proponents of Initiative 300 have focused on such investment
projects as examples of the dangers inherent in alien investment
through limited partnerships and corporations. To make the tax
incentives economically attractive, these projects have typically in-
volved the acquisition of relatively large tracts of land.202 Such ac-
quisitions have tended to contribute to land price escalation and
have intensified the competition for land for traditional farm en-
largement.20 3 Further, proponents suggest that concentration of
ownership makes land unavailable in the smaller parcel sizes
needed by starting farmers or the individual farmer seeking to ex-
pand. Because corporations, unlike people, do not have a natural
life, land can stay in the hands of the corporation indefinitely, im-
peding the natural redistribution of land inherent in individual
ownership. 204
What actual impact such projects are having on the structure
and vitality of the agricultural sector is unclear. There is no con-
census on the actual acreage of farmland owned or operated by
nonfarmers.205 This is due in large part to the difficulty of gather-
ing consistent data concerning the identity of farmland owners and
in defining such terms as "family" and "family farm."206 United
States Government studies have concluded that the inconsistent
data accumulated by the three major government agencies respon-
sible for data gathering have raised more questions than they have
provided answers concerning ownership of farmland.20 7 While it is
clear that the number of farms in Nebraska has steadily decreased
over the last several decades while the average farm size in Ne-
199. Nebraska's New Land Review, Summer, 1981, at 2, col. 2.
200. Id. at 1, col. 1.
201. Id. at 7, col. 2.
202. OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL, supra note 195, at 15.
203. Id. at 16.
204. Initiative 300 Hearing, supra note 4, at 6.
205. OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL, supra note 195, at 6.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 7.
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braska has increased,208 it is not clear whether the corporate farm
advanced or even played a meaningful role in the establishment of
these trends.20 9
The 1978 Census of Agriculture reveals that there were a total of
66,916 farms in Nebraska.2 10 The Census also establishes that ap-
proximately 86% of all farms were operated by individuals or fami-
lies in noncorporate, non-limited partnership organizations. 21l
Further, census data shows that partnerships constitute about 10%
of the farm operations in Nebraska, while corporations make up
3.6%, of which nonfamily corporate farm operations represent .3%
of the total number of farms. 212 Clearly, nonfamily ownership rep-
resents a very small percentage of total farm ownership in
Nebraska.
While the concentration of farmland ownership in "large" cor-
porations has been viewed as a menace to the success and survival
of the family farm,2 13 Initiative 300 does not restrict the acreage or
nonfarming assets of family corporations or partnerships. Recent
statistical studies show that the largest concentrations of Ne-
braska agricultural land are, in fact, in family-owned farms. Large
family-owned farms, comprising 10.6% of the total operating farms,
account for fully 36.8% of the total agricultural sales in the state.2 14
Nonfamily-owned corporate farming operations, on the other hand,
produced only 4.8% of the state's total agricultural sales. 2 15 Even
though Initiative 300 will prohibit any further concentration of
farmland in the hands of corporations owned by unrelated individ-
uals, corporations owned by related persons will be allowed to con-
tinue to acquire additional land. Therefore, continual ownership of
farmland by corporations will not be prohibited but will be merely
restricted to those entities owned predominately by related indi-
viduals. Consequently, it is apparent that Initiative 300 will perpet-
uate an already established trend towards concentration of
farmland ownership by increasingly larger family-owned entities,
including corporations.
The fear of "largeness" is not directly addressed by Initiative
300. No evidence exists to suggest that large family farm corpora-
208. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
209. See Phelps, supra note 38, at 467.
210. Bureau of the Census, supra note 39.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See Initiative 300 Hearing, supra note 4, at 4 see also "Yes on Initiative 300,"
supra note 173.
214. CARRIKE, JOHNSON, & BAKER, A LOOK AT CORPORATIONS IN FARMING IN NE-
BRASKA (January, 1983) (manuscript in process).
215. JOHNSON, THE STATUS OF FAmmy FARMING IN NEBRASKA 4 (January, 1983)
(manuscript in process).
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tions reduce the perceived danger of unfair competition or perpet-
ual ownership of land thought to be associated with nonfamily
farm corporations. The danger, if any, attributable to corporate
ownership, and particularly large corporation ownership, would
appear to transcend any differences in stock ownership between
family members and nonfamily members. If large anticompetitive
farms with monopolistic tendencies are the concern in Nebraska,
then Initiative 300 only scratches the surface of that concern.
Attention to the growing size of farm operations should be di-
rected towards existing farm operators rather than future foreign
investors. A 1979 congressional hearing on the "Status of the Fam-
ily Farm" concluded that "[t]he single most important source of
growth in farm sizes has not been corporate takeovers, but consoli-
dation of additional land into existing farms. This has led to the
concern being voiced that the single greatest threat to the 'family
farm' is other 'family farms.' ",216
The trend of farm expansion has been fueled in large part by
the need to increase farm income.2 17 Over the years, increased
production and increased production costs have lowered commod-
ity prices relative to costs, which in turn has meant lower profit
margins and increased growth incentives. 218 The Bureau of Busi-
ness Research at the University of Nebraska has concluded that
"the biggest problem facing smaller farms is low income. Although
per-unit cost and per-unit net income of smaller farms may be sim-
ilar to those of larger farms, smaller farms simply produce fewer
units and, therefore, realize smaller income." 219 Therefore,
smaller farm operations have an incentive to grow in order to pro-
vide a higher level of net income for the family farming unit, reduc-
ing reliance on other nonfarm income producing activities. 220
In recent years, as farm size has increased and farmland values
have appreciated rapidly, the wealth of the farmer has similarly
risen. This additional wealth has enabled the large farmers to se-
cure more credit against current holdings to allow them to buy
more land and farm equipment.221 However, the assertion that
large corporate farms create unfair competition with smaller fam-
216. COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION AND FORESTRY, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
STATUS OF THE FAILmY FARM 4 (Comm. Print June, 1979) (emphasis in origi-
nal) [hereinafter cited as STATUS OF THE FAmiLY FARM: 19791.
217. UNL News, Business in Nebraska, "Structure and Efficiency of Nebraska
Farm," Prepared by the Bureau of Business Research College of Business
Administration, Vol. 61, No. 14, at 5 (January, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Busi-
ness in Nebraska].
218. Id.
219. Id. at 3.
220. Id.
221. STATUS OF THE FAMiLY FARM: 1982, supra note 42, at 37.
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ily farm operations due to economy of size advantages has been
challenged in recent years. A July, 1981, United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA) study entitled "Economies of Size in U.S.
Field Crop Farming,"222 concluded that "[t] echnological change is
not always accompanied by increasing economies of size .... [i]t
appears that technological change has allowed, rather than forced
farms to grow larger."223 Technology, therefore, has permitted
"larger farms to produce at a per-unit cost which is roughly
equivalent to smaller farms. .. ,224 The USDA study also stated
that "economies of size in field crop farming are not great....
Small or medium-size farms in most regions are nearly as efficient
as large farms.1 225 The USDA study concluded:
[F1 or all but the smallest farms, economies of size are not a significant
factor in the success or failure of a farm. The report says "...
[c]oncentrating on management and productivity appears to be the most
important means of increasing efficiency for commercial farms; size is of
much less importance .... These studies all challenge the conclusion
that small farms do not support families adequately because they are inef-
ficient and that farms grow to become more efficient."
2 2 6
It appears that a purpose of restricting the competitiveness of
large corporations due to their efficiency is of questionable
legitimacy.
The federal tax system places the large farmer with income in a
high income tax bracket at a competitive advantage over the small
farmer without a large amount of nonfarming income. Large farms
can operate at a tax loss and can still generate positive cash flow
due to investment tax credits and depreciation.227 The tax system
"tends to penalize the farmer who provides most of his labor sup-
ply from family resources, buys few purchased inputs, and extends
the life of his equipment by careful maintenance and repair...
222. T. MILLER, G. RODEWALD, & R. McELRoy, ECONOMIES OF SIZE IN U.S. FIELD
CROP FARMING, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIc REP. No. 472 (U.S. Dept. of Agricul-
ture, Economics and Statistics Service, July, 1981) [hereinafter cited as
ECONOMIES OF SIZE].
223. Business in Nebraska, supra note 217, at 3 (emphasis in original).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 3, 5 (quoting ECONOMIES OF SIZE, supra note 222, at 22).
227. See J. JUERGENSMEYER & J. WADLEY, AGRcuLTURAL LAw, ch. 34 (1982). See
also "Recent Trends in Land Values, Use and Ownership in the United
States," testimony prepared by Philip M. Raup for Public Meeting on the
Structure of American Agriculture and Rural Communities, U.S. Dept. of Ag-
riculture (April, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Recent Trends]; Comment, Pro-
posed Anticorporate Farm Legislation, 1972 WIs. L. REV. 1189, 1199-1203
(1972). For additional analysis of the manner in which the federal laws of
taxation impact the structure of agricultural investments, see "Influencing
the Structure of Agriculture Through Taxation," presented as part of a semi-
nar series by Neil M. Harl, March 12, 1980, Iowa State University.
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[whereby] [t] he farm sector loses resiliency. '228 It seems inevita-
ble, due to the tax and ownership advantages, that farm sizes will
continue to grow. 2 2 9 The trend towards incorporation will also
likely expand as farm sizes increase. The large family corpora-
tions will probably continue to grow without the added strain of
other corporate farms in the free enterprise system and the small
farms will continue their struggles to break even.
Ironically, the most recent tax laws have provided a mechanism
for circumventing one of the primary objectives of Initiative 300:
the exclusion of foreign investment in farmland. This mechanism
involves the use of a Subchapter S Corporation, which has many of
the attributes of a regular corporation, i.e., limited liability and
continuity of existence, but is taxed very much like a limited part-
nership in that profits, losses, and other tax benefits, such as in-
vestment tax credits and depreciation deductions, are passed
through directly to the investor.230 In essence, the Subchapter S
Corporation is an alternate vehicle for maximizing tax benefits to
investors from the ownership and operation of land, buildings, and
machinery. Recent changes in federal tax law2 31 have expanded
the usefulness of the Subchapter S Corporation in tax shelter in-
vestments by permitting the stock of such corporations to have dif-
ferent voting rights.232 Conceivably, both voting and nonvoting
stock could be issued and outstanding simultaneously, which
could serve not only to make the Subchapter S Corporation even
more like a limited partnership, i.e., limited partners have no voice
in management, but could also permit a Subchapter S Corporation
to qualify as a "family farm corporation" under Initiative 300 while
retaining many of the tax advantages for investors associated with
limited partnerships, which Initiative 300 has sought to severely
restrict. This could be accomplished by permitting one stock-
holder, who would agree to live on the farm or provide active day-
to-day labor and management, to own all of the stock with voting
rights, while additional nonvoting stock could be issued to up to
thirty-four unrelated individuals wishing only a passive invest-
ment role with possible tax shelter benefits. 233 Such a result is
228. Recent Trends, supra note 227, at 2.
229. Harl, Farm Corporations-Present and Proposed Restrictive Legislation, 1970
Bus. LAw 1247, 1257 (1970). See also Phelps, supra note 38, at 450 n.74.
230. See I.R.C. § 1361 (1983).
231. See, Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669 (1982).
232. I.R.C. § 1361(c) (4) (1983).
233. Seminar- Taxes and Initiative 300, Nebraska Continuing Legal Education
(January 21, 1983). See NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8, cl. 1(A); see infra Appendix
1. The example of a single shareholder holding all the voting stock in a Sub-
chapter S Corporation is perhaps a bit extreme. Neither the Internal Revenue
Code, the Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, nor the Committee Reports re-
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particularly ironic because investors in a Subchapter S Corpora-
tion do not have to be related to receive substantial tax benefits,
whereas investors in a limited partnership would have to meet Ini-
tiative 300's consanguinity requirements in order to receive the
same tax benefits.234
Since nothing in Initiative 300 bars a corporation or partnership
from acquiring stock in existing corporations owning farmland, for-
eign entities seeking an investment in Nebraska farmland will be
able to do so through the acquisition of stock of existing farm cor-
porations. Another recent tax law change will make it more
favorable for corporations to acquire stock of farm corporations in
existence prior to the effective date of Initiative 300 without effect-
ing a sale of the land owned by the corporation.235 Section 338 of
the Internal Revenue Code now permits an entity acquiring stock
to make an election to have the transaction treated as a purchase
of assets, resulting in a step-up in tax basis.236 The acquiring en-
tity, consequently, will realize greater depreciation benefits on de-
preciable assets than would otherwise have been available. Since
Initiative 300's provisions are triggered upon the actual sale of
land, a sale of stock transaction will permit land to be transferred
from one owner to another without violating the provisions of Initi-
ative 300.237 Foreign-owned corporations and partnerships will be
able to acquire the stock of existing Nebraska farm corporations
with favorable tax results and thereby indirectly own farmland
and engage in farming operations, a result not intended by Initia-
tive 300.238
Furthermore, the family farm residence requirement in Initia-
tive 300 is illusory since it contains a cure provision which allows
lated to the Act (Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L No. 97-354, 96 Stat.
1669, S. Rpt. 97-640 (1983)) describe the extent to which voting rights may be
differentiated. Permitting one shareholder, who would reside on the farm and
engage in the day-to-day activities, to own a majority of the voting stock
would also qualify the corporation under Initiative 300. Additionally, this
structure might insulate the investors from an assertion by the Internal Reve-
nue Service that the intent of Congress was being circumscribed by having
some stock with no voting rights whatsoever.
234. While regular corporations could also circumvent Initiative 300 by using non-
voting stock to attract nonfamily investors into a farmland investment, there
would be less economic incentive to passive investors because many of the
tax shelter benefits would be captured within the corporate structure rather
than being passed on directly to the investors, as in a Subchapter S
Corporation.
235. I.R.C. § 338 (1983). For a detailed discussion of I.R.C. § 338, see Ginsburg,
Taxing Corporate Acquisitions, 38 TAx. L. REv. 171, 251-317 (1983).
236. I.R.C. § 338 (1983).
237. NEB. CoNsT. art. XII, § 8, cl. 1; see infra Appendix 1.
238. NEB. CONsT. art. X1I, § 8, cl. I (A); see infra Appendix 1.
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fifty years for a family to requalify as a family farm corporation.239
Perpetuating control of farmland ownership by family farm corpo-
rations through such liberal requalification provisions appears to
undermine the free market system and encourage the creation of a
type of landed aristocracy. This phenomenon, combined with land
price inflation, creates inheritance problems:
Present provisions of inheritance tax laws, combined with the capital
gains tax structure, may serve as a disincentive to sell land. This poses
the potential, if unchecked, for the eventual emergence of a "landed class"
with attendant implications for tenure arrangements and the distribution
of benefits (especially those that tend to get capitalized into asset values)
from farm prices and policies.
2 4 0
Rising land values and inheritance laws "seem to be protecting
current family farms instead of the family farming system, with
the result that we may be in danger of developing a closed agricul-
tural economy." 241 Initiative 300 in no way addresses these highly
complex socio-economic problems.
One of the primary purposes of Initiative 300 is to protect the
farmer from the supposedly evil effects of large corporations. Initi-
ative 300 merely excludes one sector of corporations whose owners
are not fortunate enough to be related to one another. Therefore,
the legislation and its effect is substantially underinclusive. If fam-
fly farm legislation is "to be effective in preserving small family
farms, legislation of this type must not be underinclusive. That is,
it must ban all forms in which large industrial farms can function.
Otherwise, instead of eliminating such farms, the legislature will
merely cause them to reorganize." 242
If a court agrees that the distinction between related and unre-
lated individuals within the corporate form is sufficiently impre-
cise, it should find that Initiative 300 violates the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.24 3 Similarly, there seems to
be no reasonable public policy to be served by allowing first cous-
ins to do business in a corporate form which is denied to the next
239. The "cure" provision states:
If a family farm corporation, which has qualified under all the re-
quirements of a family farm or ranch corporation, ceases to meet the
defined criteria, it shall have fifty years, if the ownership of the ma-
jority of the stock of such corporation continues to be held by per-
sons related to one another within the fourth degree of kindred or
their spouses, and their landholdings are not increased, to either re-
qualify as a family farm corporation or dissolve and return to per-
sonal ownership.
NEB. CONsT. art Xfl, § 8, cl. 1; see infra Appendix 1.
240. STATUS OF THE FAmY FARM: 1979, supra note 216, at 5.
241. Id.
242. Comment, supra note 227, at 1205.
243. See Leedes, supra note 112, at 641 (referring to Fiss, Groups and Equal Pro-
tection, 5 PHiLosoPHY AND PUB. AFF. 107, 111 (1976)).
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degree of kindred. This degree of consanguinity appears to be an
arbitrary line-drawing which bears no rational relationship to the
objective of preventing the concentration of agricultural land own-
ership in large corporations. Furthermore, if a rational purpose
could be found for distinguishing family relationships, the fifty-
year cure provision would be wholly unnecessary. To draw a line
between degrees of family relationships as a threshold require-
ment for farmland ownership and then to permit the requirement
to be ignored for up to fifty years simply confounds any rationality
of the requirement in the first instance and nullifies the objectives
sought to be achieved. Consequently, the degree of kindred re-
quired for family farm corporations in Initiative 300 does not pro-
mote any identifiable legitimate state purpose.
These classifications do not bear a rational relationship to the
identified purpose of protecting small family farms from the en-
croachment of centralized farmland ownership by large corpora-
tions. Too little is known. Congressional committee reports on the
status of farms in the United States conclude that "[u] nless trend
data, and data useful on the local level, can be compiled, there will
be no basis for making sound policy decisions on the ownership
and control of farmland."24 4 Without this trend data, "legislative
efforts will be based on sheer guesswork,"245 and legislators will
tend "to accept conclusions that are based more on emotion than
on fact."246 Before a state can act, it "must have adequate informa-
tion indicating what the trends are in farmland ownership at the
local level. Such information does not exist, unfortunately, and the
committee is unaware of plans to gather it."247 The dearth of infor-
mation and the wealth of conjecture about the impact of corpora-
tions on the farming community make it evident that the
classifications in Initiative 300 should not withstand equal protec-
tion review. Choosing to restrict corporations comprised of unre-
lated persons from farming or ranching is to make a mockery of
common sense.
b. Preservation of Rural Life
Initiative 300 proponents have asserted that the amendment
was intended, in part, to help preserve a sound rural policy in Ne-
braska by protecting or actually encouraging the concept of family
244. Absentee Oumership of Farmland: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Family
Farms, Rural Developmen and Special Studies of the Committee on Agricul-
ture, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 4 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Absentee Ownership:
1980].
245. Id. at 17.
246. STATUS OF THE FAmLY FAmM: 1979, supra note 216, at iv.
247. Absentee Ownership: 1980, supra note 244, at 1.
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farms operated by Nebraska residents upon their own land. In-
deed, the United States Congress has consistently supported and
espoused the value of the family farm in maintaining the well-be-
ing of American rural society.248 Congress articulated this public
policy recently in the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977: "the main-
tenance of the family farm system of agriculture is essential to the
social well-being of the Nation and the competitive production of
adequate supplies of food and fiber."249 However, in adopting the
Food and Agriculture Act, Congress also acknowledged that very
little was really known about the makeup and character of Ameri-
can agricultural society or what factors were really impacting the
evolving structure of the farm sector.25 0 Therefore, the Food and
Agriculture Act directed the Secretary of Agriculture to submit to
Congress a written report annually containing current information
on trends in family farm operations. The first such report,
presented in June of 1979, stated this basic tenet: "For informed
public policy judgments, an understanding of the forces affecting
farm structure is essential. It is important to know, in fact, that a
given public policy.., has the consequences on farm structure
that are popularly believed." 25 '
With the passage of Initiative 300, the people of Nebraska ap-
pear to be attempting to stop or reverse the evolving character of
Nebraska agriculture in an effort to preserve the institution of the
family farm and the rural society which it has fostered. However,
the informed observer of American agriculture, and Nebraska agri-
culture in particular, must acknowledge that in reality there exists
a complexly interrelated set of economic, social, and psychological
reasons for the changing structure of American agriculture.
Through the years, as the structure changes, so must the character
of the rural way of life which it supports.
The central issue is whether Initiative 300's restrictions on non-
family corporate and syndicate ownership and operation of agri-
cultural land will advance or even preserve traditional rural
society.252 Fundamental to the analysis of this issue is a determi-
248. See generally Taylor, supra note 35, at 475.
249. STATUS OF THE FAlMLY FA m: 1979, supra note 216, at 3 (quoting Food and
Agricultural Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-113, § 102(a), 91 Stat. 913, 918.)
250. STATUS OF THE FAmMY FARM: 1979, supra note 216, at 3.
251. Id. (emphasis supplied).
252. What is the "traditional rural society?" Not that long ago, one author wrote:
[Tihe family-sized farm is the American ideal and means that the
owner and his son or sons can perform the actual work of tillage, the
female members of the household smoothing the way by providing
home comforts, assisting about chores, or in field or meadow as pres-
sure of work may dictate.
Taylor, supra note 35, at 477 (quoting J. SCHAFER, THE SOcMAL HISTORY OF
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nation of whether corporate ownership of farmland substantially
impacts rural life. The most intensive research conducted in this
area was made in the Arvin-Dinuba study in 1946,253 involving two
California communities, one founded upon large-scale farms and
the other founded upon smaller, family-size farms.254 The study
concluded that the small farm communities were economically, so-
cially, and culturally much healthier than the communities with
large farms.255 Due to this finding, the Arvin-Dinuba study has
naturally become the beacon for opponents of corporate farm own-
ership. However, it is important to note that the Arvin-Dinuba
study focused primarily on the relative sizes of the farm units,
rather than on the character of the ownership of the underlying
operating entities involved.2 56 The study, therefore, only cautions
that large farm communities are less healthy than small farm com-
munities. It does not address or document the impact on rural so-
ciety of corporate landholders, small or large, based on the nature
or character of the owners of the corporate stock. In fact, no statis-
tical information can be found which does make such a
comparison.257
Further, Bruce Johnson, an agricultural economist at the Uni-
versity of Nebraska, pointed out that the California study provides
a much different result when applied to the Nebraska agricultural
community:
While the Arvin-Dinuba study expresses a valid concern for rural life due
to the economic incentives which encourage large farming corporations to
vertically integrate, the impact of corporations on rural life, nevertheless,
,ill continue to be much less in Nebraska than it has been in California.
One reason that corporate influence in the midwest will never be as strong
as in California is due to the land-base agriculture rather than factory-
type fanning which is prominent in California. A corporate organization
works well in a broiler [chicken] plant and with intensive truck farming in
AmmicAN AGRICULTURE 289-90 (1936)). This author's words denote the
changing times.
In the 1950's similar arguments were being waged in the fight to save the
family store. Today, the efficiency and convenience of the supermarkets will
rarely be disputed. While some personal touch may be lost with the decline of
the Ma and Pa grocery store, the benefit to society of ease of access to desired
products probably outweighs the need to maintain a way of life for a small
sector of our society.
253. SENATE SPECIAL COM1L TO STUDY THE PRoBLEMs OF AGRICULTURAL BusiNEss,
SMALL BusINEss AND THE CoMMUNITY, 79 Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1946).
254. Id. See also Taylor, supra note 35, at 489-91; Comment, The South Dakota
Family Farm Act of 1974. Salvation or Frustration For the Family Farmer?,
20 S.D.L. REV. 575, 578-80 (1975) [hereinafter cited as South Dakota Farm
Act]; Comment, supra note 227, at 1203-05.
255. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. TO STUDY THE PROBLEMS OF AGRICULTURAL BusmNEss,
SmALL BusINEss AND THE CommuNTY, 79 Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1946).
256. Id.
257. See generally OwNERsmP AND CONTRoL, supra note 195.
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small areas. The midwest however, is strung out with a much larger, less
contiguous land area which, coupled with a low turnover rate of owner-
ship, cuts efficiency and management, making it less desirable for corpora-
tions to invest in farmland.
2 5 8
Another study was made in 1968 by the South Dakota Legisla-
tive Research Council.259 Agricultural trends from 1932 to 1968 in
North Dakota and South Dakota were compared "in an effort to
determine what, if any, impact corporate farming may have had in
South Dakota.' 260 South Dakota had never had restrictions on cor-
porate farming.26 ' "On the assumption that the economic, social
and political characteristics of the two States are basically simi-
lar,1262 the agricultural trends revealed "that North Dakota's anti-
corporate farming law has not significantly helped to maintain
farm population, lower the farm tenancy rate, or to maintain the
number of farms.263
Contrary to the concerns expressed in the Arvin-Dinuba study,
Initiative 300 restricts corporate ownership of agricultural land not
on the basis of size, but rather on the basis of who owns the con-
trolling interest in the underlying entity.2 64 Under Initiative 300, a
family farm could be of any size. Consequently, the public pur-
pose behind Initiative 300, to protect the rural way of life from
large corporations, is not accomplished by restricting nonfamily
corporate ownership of farmland. No evidence exists to support a
conclusion that the evil attributes of large corporate farms would
be in any way ameliorated by ensuring that voting control of the
corporate stock is owned by members of a family. Similarly, corpo-
rate or syndicate ownership concentrated in the hands of family
members no more distant than the fourth degree of kindred bears
no relationship to the size of the basic entity involved. Initiative
300, therefore, fails to rationally promote the objective of preserv-
ing the rural way of life.
c. Corporate Stewardship of the Land
The arguments suggesting that corporations are environmen-
tally raping the farmland of Nebraska are not consistent with the
258. Interview with Dr. Bruce Johnson, Associate Professor of Agricultural Eco-
nomics at the University of Nebraska - Lincoln, in Lincoln, Nebraska (Janu-
ary 20, 1983).
259. S. Res. No. 6, 43rd Sess., S.D. Leg. (1968) reprinted in South Dakota State
Legislative Research Council, Corporate Ownership of Agricultural Land and
Farming 28 (Aug. 15, 1968) (Staff Memorandum).
260. Id. at 19.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 25.
264. NEB. CONsT. art. XII, § 8, cl. 1(A); see infra Appendix 1.
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long-term nature of investments in farming. While no statistics ex-
ist to show that corporate farmers are poorer land stewards than
noncorporate farmers, it is reasonable to note that corporate inves-
tors desire capital gains. If they destroy the land while waiting for
it to appreciate, they will not realize a return on their investment.
If the topsoil is ruined, no resale market will exist for the land.
Admittedly, there have been instances of poor conservation prac-
tices associated with corporate and syndicate farming opera-
tions, 265 but there is no evidence available relating to Nebraska
agricultural land which supports a conclusion that family farmers
are any better stewards of the land than nonfamily corporate
farmers.
Linda K Lee, an authority on the stewardship of land,
presented a paper to the American Agricultural Economics Associ-
ation's annual meeting entitled "The Impact of Landownership
Factors on Soil Conservation." Ms. Lee's research focused on na-
tional tests tabulating soil erosion rates on the basis of different
groups of owners. Her study incorporated data which is presently
being accumulated by the USDA in their Land Management Study.
Ms. Lee concluded that while significant attention has been fo-
cused on alleged high erosion rates attributable to land owned by
large corporations, the "[r] esults of the structure analysis indicate
that nationally there are no significant differences in mean soil
losses between different types of ownership groups." 2 6 6 Ms. Lee
further summarized that "the data indicate that most of the re-
ported differences in erosion rates among types of landowners can
probably be attributed to physical rather than management
factors."267
By restricting .3% of the agricultural farm operators, Nebraska
is not rationally curing its environmental or ecological problems.
The effect, if any, will be miniscule. Once again, the classifications
which restrict ownership of corporations and syndicates on the ba-
sis of narrow family relationships do not rationally relate to the
environmental purposes voiced in support of Initiative 300.
V. CONCLUSION
Initiative 300 fails to deal with the underlying economic realities
of farming in today's economy. Nebraska is fighting an economic
inferno of incomprehensible origin with an anti-corporate fan.
265. See Nebraska's New Land Review, Summer, 1981, at 1, 6-7, cols. 1-3, published
by The Center for Rural Affairs, Walthill, Nebr.
266. Lee, "The Impact of Landownership Factors on Soil Conservation,"
presented at the annual meeting of The American Agricultural Economics
Association (July 29, 1980).
267. Id.
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Large corporate ownership of farm and ranch land is still possible
not only for family corporations but also for any corporation limit-
ing its class of voting shareholders-most favorably for Subchapter
S Corporations. The complexities and ambiguities of Initiative 300
are massive, and the perceived will of the people to protect the
family farm may in fact be thwarted by a misdirected, emotional,
and irrational response to a blinding fear that Nebraska agricul-
tural land is being swallowed up by the soulless, corporate con-
glomerates and bandit limited partnerships with invisible alien
investors.2 68 While the purposes promoted by Initiative 300's sup-
porters are sincere and deeply rooted in a traditional way of life,
the law demands that the views of the majority, when transformed
into law, must rationally relate to their intended purposes. Initia-
tive 300 cannot be conceived in any rational way to achieve its in-
tended purposes. The Initiative, in light of reliable statistics,
neither addresses a real danger nor realistically accomplishes a so-
lution to even a perceived danger. Therefore, Initiative 300's classi-
fications are of highly questionable validity.
The classifications which pit related against unrelated individu-
als and first cousins against second cousins are a weak and ineffec-
tive medicinal salve. The survival of the family farm is not to be
squeezed from such narrow definitions of popular ideals. The fad-
ing prominence of a valued way of life is the product of a set of
factors so complex, yet so methodical, that the inevitable wave of
change will need far more to be stopped than the naive and frail
erection of an anti-corporate dam. 269 The voters of Nebraska have
268. One week after the adoption of Initiative 300, Secretary of State Allen Beer-
man, charged with the enforcement of the Amendment, was quoted as saying-
"Nobody understands the amendment. That's why we won't see anything
happen for three to four weeks .... More attorneys than farmers are looking
at it and researching the implications." Lincoln Journal, Nov. 9, 1982, at 1, col.
3. Unfortunately for the electorate, Senator Fenger's remarks at the Public
Hearing for Initiative 300 may prove to be prophetic:
Perhaps it [Initiative 300] should be labeled "Initiative petition to de-
stroy the family farm" since it has the potential of hurting the very
segment of Nebraskans that [it] is purported to help, or .. . how
about an "initiative petition to enhance and preserve the bank ac-
counts of members of the Bar Association?"
Initiative 300 Hearing, supra note 4, at 13.
269. Alternatives to Initiative 300 are available on the state level. The state legisla-
ture could propose legislation which would: (1) limit corporate farm acreage;
(2) step-up enforcement of anti-trust legislation to prevent unfair market
competition by vertically integrated corporate conglomerates; (3) create vehi-
cles for government assisted financing for small farms and new farmers seek-
ing to enter the business; (4) enact state subsidy programs and special tax
provisions to assist small family farms; and (5) adopt meaningful and en-
forceable soil conservation and environmental protection laws to insure the
preservation of Nebraska's vital agricultural resources. See Phelps, supra
note 38, at 464-65; see also Comment, supra note 227, at 1208.
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shot a haphazard constitutional arrow into space in an attempt to
pierce the "evil," a destroyer of family farms, whatever and wher-
ever it may be.*
Patricia Pansing Brooks '84
On July 6, 1983, an action was filed in the District Court of Lancaster County,
Nebraska, challenging the constitutionality of Initiative 300 on the ground,
among others, that Initiative 300 is in conflict with the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. Omaha
Nat'l. Bank v. Paul L. Douglas, Att'y Gen., Doc. 372, No. 191 (Lancaster
County, Nebraska, Dist. Ct., filed July 6, 1983).
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APPENDIX 1
That Article XII of the Constitution of the State of Nebraska be amended by
adding a new section numbered 8 and sub-sections as numbered, notwithstanding
any other provisions of this Constitution.
Sec. 8(1) No corporation or syndicate shall acquire, or otherwise obtain an inter-
est, whether legal, beneficial, or otherwise, in any title to real estate used for farm-
ing or ranching in this state, or engage in farming or ranching.
Corporation shall mean any corporation organized under the laws of any
state of the United States or any country or any partnership of which such
corporation is a partner.
Farming or ranching shall mean (i) the cultivation of land for the produc-
tion of agricultural crops, fruit, or other horticultural products, or (ii) the
ownership, keeping or feeding of animals for the production of livestock or
livestock products.
Syndicate shall mean any limited partnership organized under the laws of
any state of the United States or any country, other than limited partner-
ships in which the partners are members of a family, or a trust created for
the benefit of a member of that family, related to one another within the
fourth degree of kindred according to the rules of civil law, or their spouses,
at least one of whom is a person residing on or actively engaged in the day
to day labor and management of the farm or ranch, and none of whom are
nonresident aliens. This shall not include general partnerships.
These restrictions shall not apply to:
(A) A family farm or ranch corporation. Family farm or ranch corporation
shall mean a corporation engaged in farming or ranching or the ownership
of agricultural land, in which the majority of the voting stock is held by
members of a family, or a trust created for the benefit of a member of that
family, related to one another within the fourth degree of kindred according
to the rules of civil law, or their spouses, at least one of whom is a person
residing on or actively engaged in the day to day labor and management of
the farm or ranch and none of whose stockholders are non-resident aliens
and none of whose stockholders are corporations or partnerships, unless all
of the stockholders or partners of such entities are persons related within
the fourth degree of kindred to the majority of stockholders in the family
farm corporation.
These restrictions shall not apply to:
(B) Non-profit corporations.
These restrictions shall not apply to:
(C) Nebraska Indian tribal corporations.
These restrictions shall not apply to:
(D) Agricultural land, which, as of the effective date of this Act, is being
farmed or ranched, or which is owned or leased, or in which there is a legal
or beneficial interest in title directly or indirectly owned, acquired, or ob-
tained by a corporation or syndicate, so long as such land or other interest
in title shall be held in continuous ownership or under continuous lease by
the same such corporation or syndicate, and including such additional own-
ership or leasehold as is reasonably necessary to meet the requirements of
pollution control regulations. For the purposes of this exemption, land
purchased on a contract signed as of the effective date of this amendment,
shall be considered as owned on the effective date of this amendment.
These restrictions shall not apply to:
(E) A farm or ranch operated for research or experimental purposes, if
any commercial sales from such farm or ranch are only incidental to the
research or experimental objectives of the corporation or syndicate.
These restrictions shall not apply to:
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(F) Agricultural land operated by a corporation for the purpose of raising
poultry.
These restrictions shall not apply to:
(G) Land leased by alfalfa processors for the production of alfalfa.
These restrictions shall not apply to:
(H) Agricultural land operated for the purpose of growing seed, nursery
plants, or sod.
These restrictions shall not apply to:
(I) Mineral rights on agricultural land.
These restrictions shall not apply to:
(J) Agricultural land acquired or leased by a corporation or syndicate for
immediate or potential use for nonfarming or nonranching purposes. A cor-
poration or syndicate may hold such agricultural land in such acreage as
may be necessary to its nonfarm or nonranch business operation, but pend-
ing the development of such agricultural land for nonfarm or nonranch pur-
poses, not to exceed a period of five years, such land may not be used for
farming or ranching except under lease to a family farm or ranch corpora-
tion or a non-syndicate and non-corporate farm or ranch.
These restrictions shall not apply to:
(K) Agricultural lands or livestock acquired by a corporation or syndicate
by process of law in the collection of debts, or by any procedures for the
enforcement of a lien, encumbrance, or claim thereon, whether created by
mortgage or otherwise. Any lands so acquired shall be disposed of within a
period of five years and shall not be used for farming or ranching prior to
being disposed of, except under a lease to a family farm or ranch corpora-
tion or a non-syndicate and non-corporate farm or ranch.
These restrictions shall not apply to:
(L) A bona fide encumbrance taken for purposes of security.
These restrictions shall not apply to:
(M) Custom spraying, fertilizing, or harvesting.
These restrictions shall not apply to:
(N) Livestock futures contracts, livestock purchased for slaughter, or live-
stock purchased and resold within two weeks.
If a family farm corporation, which has qualified under all the requirements of a
family farm or ranch corporation, ceases to meet the defined criteria, it shall have
fifty years, if the ownership of the majority of the stock of such corporation contin-
ues to be held by persons related to one another within the fourth degree of kindred
or their spouses, and their landholdings are not increased, to either re-qualify as a
family farm corporation or dissolve and return to personal ownership.
The Secretary of State shall monitor corporate and syndicate agricultural land
purchases and corporate and syndicate farming and ranching operations, and notify
the Attorney General of any possible violations. If the Attorney General has reason
to believe that a corporation or syndicate is violating this amendment, he or she
shall commence an action in district court to enjoin any pending illegal land
purchase, or livestock operation, or to force divestiture of land held in violation of
this amendment. The court shall order any land held in violation of this amend-
ment to be divested within two years. If land so ordered by the court has not been
divested within two years, the court shall declare the land escheated to the State of
Nebraska.
If the Secretary of State or Attorney General fails to perform his or her duties as
directed by this amendment, Nebraska citizens and entities shall have standing in
district court to seek enforcement.
The Nebraska Legislature may enact, by general law, further restrictions prohibit-
ing certain agricultural operations that the legislature deems contrary to the intent
of this section. (Adopted, 1982).
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APPENDIX 2t
t The above table of consanguinity, showing degrees of relationships, was
reprinted from the UNIrFoRm PROBATE CODE PRACTICE MlANAL § 2-103.
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